Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University

Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law
Eric J. Schmertz Selected Reports, Awards and
Opinions, 1967-2006 Special Collection

Eric J. Schmertz Special Collections

1992

Reports, Awards, and Opinions 1992-2
Eric J. Schmertz

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/schmertz_ROA
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Schmertz, Eric J., "Reports, Awards, and Opinions 1992-2" (1992). Eric J. Schmertz Selected Reports,
Awards and Opinions, 1967-2006 Special Collection. 37.
https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/schmertz_ROA/37

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Eric J. Schmertz Special Collections at Scholarly
Commons at Hofstra Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Eric J. Schmertz Selected Reports, Awards and
Opinions, 1967-2006 Special Collection by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. For
more information, please contact lawlas@hofstra.edu.

REPORT
TO

THE PRESIDENT
BY

EMERGENCY BOARD
NO. 221

Submitted Pursuant
Dated
and
The Railway

to Executive Order No. 12795
March 31, 1992
Section 10 of
Labor Act, as Amended

Investigation of dispute between the Consolidated Rail Corporation
and its employees represented by the Brotherhood of Maintenance of
Way Employes.
(National Mediation Board Case No. A-12260)

Washington, D.C.

May 28, 1992

Washington, D.C.
May 28, 1992

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. President:
On March 31, 1992, pursuant to Section 10 of the Railway Labor
Act, as amended, and by Executive Order 12795, you established an
Emergency Board to investigate a dispute between the Consolidated
Rail Corporation and its employees represented by the Brotherhood
of Maintenance of Way Employes.
The Board now has the honor to submit its Report and Recommendations to you concerning an appropriate resolution of the dispute
between the above named parties.
Respectfully,

Benjamin Aaron, Chairman
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I.

CREATION OF THE EMERGENCY BOARD

Emergency Board No. 221 (the Board) was established by the
President pursuant to Section 10 of the Railway Labor Act, as
amended, 45 U.S.C. §160, and by Executive Order No. 12795. The
Board was ordered to investigate and report its findings and
recommendations regarding an unadjusted dispute between the
Consolidated Rail Corporation and its employees represented by the
Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes (BMWE). A copy of the
Executive Order is attached as Appendix "A."
On April 3, 1992, the President appointed Benjamin Aaron of
Santa Monica, California, as Chairman of the Board. Preston J.
Moore of Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, Eric J. Schmertz of Riverdale,
New York, David P. Twomey of Quincy, Massachusetts, and Arnold M.
Zack of Boston, Massachusetts, were appointed as Members.
The
National Mediation Board appointed Roland Watkins, Esq., as Special
Assistant to the Board.
II. . PARTIES TO THE DISPUTE
A.

The Consolidated Rail Corporation

The Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail) is the fifth
largest freight railroad in the country in terms of revenue tonmiles and miles operated.
The carrier is the largest railroad
system in the Northeast-Midwest quadrant of the United States,
operating over a network of approximately 13,400 route miles
serving the areas east of the Mississippi River and north of a line
running from Washington, D.C., to St. Louis, Missouri. In 1990,
the railroad handled 84.1 billion revenue ton-miles generating
revenues of $3.3 billion.
Conrail carries approximately 3.6
million carloads per year, about one-eighth of the national total.
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Conrail is an important connection for most of the other large
railroads in the nation. In addition, Conrail connects with 158
shortline railroads.
B.

The Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes

The Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes (BMWE)
represents approximately 5,200 employees who principally perform
track laying and surfacing work, roadway maintenance, and certain
bridge, building and structural work.
III.

ACTIVITIES OF THE EMERGENCY BOARD

The parties to the disputes met with the Emergency Board in
Washington, D.C., on April 6, 1992, to discuss procedural matters.
On April 13-15, 1992, the Board conducted hearings regarding
the issues in Washington, D.C. The parties were given full and
adequate opportunity to present oral testimony, documentary
evidence, and argument in support of their respective positions.
A formal record was made of the proceedings.
The parties agreed to and the President approved an
extension of the time that the Emergency Board had to report its
recommendations until May 28, 1992.
The BMWE presented its position through written statements and
oral testimony by Mac A. Fleming, President, BMWE; Jed Dodd,
General Chairman, BMWE; Thomas R. Roth, President of the Labor
Bureau, Inc.; Ivy Silver, Principal at Leshner, Silver & Associates; Joel Myron, BMWE; James Cassese, BMWE; and John Davidson,
General Chairman, BMWE.
The organization was represented by
William A. Bon, Jr., Esq., General Counsel of the BMWE.
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Conrail presented its position through written statements and
oral testimony by James A. Hagen, Chairman, President and Chief
Executive Officer of Conrail; Robert W. Anestis, President of
Anestis & Company; Charles I. Hopkins, Jr., Chairman, National
Carriers' Conference Committee; Charles H. Fay, Ph.D., Associate
Professor of Industrial Relations and Human Resources, Institute of
Management and Labor Relations, Rutgers University; Seymore
Burchman, Principal with Simpson and Company; Richard Pyson, Vice
President - Transportation, Conrail; G. Raymond Weaver, Assistant
Vice President - Labor Relations, Conrail; John B. Rossi, Jr.,
General Counsel - Labor, Conrail; Jeffrey Burton, Senior Director Labor Relations, Conrail; Bob Dawson, General Superintendent Safety, Conrail; and Robert E. Swert, Vice President - Labor
Relations, Conrail.
Conrail was represented by Ralph J. Moore,
Jr., Esq., of Shea and Gardner.
Pursuant to the request of the Board, on April 27, 1992, the
parties presented written lists of the issues they deemed still in
dispute before the Board.
After the close of the hearings, the Board met in executive
session to prepare its Report and Recommendations.
The entire
record considered by the Board consists of approximately four
hundred and seventy (470) pages of transcript and sixteen hundred
(1,600) pages of exhibits.
IV.

HISTORY OF THE DISPUTE

On or about June 10, 1988, the BMWE, in accordance with
Section 6 of the Railway Labor Act, served notice on Conrail of its
demands for changes in the provisions of the existing collective
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bargaining agreement. The BMWE, on May 19, 1989, applied to the
National Mediation Board (NMB) for its mediatory service.
The
application was docketed as NMB Case No. A-12260.
Mediation was undertaken by Mediators Robert J. Cerjan and
Thomas R. Green. These efforts were unsuccessful.
On March 2, 1992, the NMB, in accordance with Section 5,
First, of the Railway Labor Act, offered the BMWE and Conrail the
opportunity to submit their controversy to arbitration.
Conrail
declined the proffer of arbitration. Accordingly, on March 4,
1992, the NMB notified the parties that it was terminating its
mediatory efforts.
On March 5, 1992, pursuant to Section 10 of the Railway Labor
Act, the NMB advised the President of the United States that, in
its judgment, the dispute threatened to substantially interrupt
interstate commerce to a degree such as to deprive various sections
of the country of essential transportation service.
The President, in his discretion, issued Executive Order 12795
on March 31, 1992, to create, effective April 3, 1992, this Board
to investigate and report concerning the dispute.
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V.

INTRODUCTION

The threshold question before us concerns the impact on this
Presidential Emergency Board 221 of the recommendations of PEB 219,
as enacted by Congress, and as reviewed by the Special Board.
Most of the nation's Class I line haul railroads, including
Conrail, and their labor organizations, including the Brotherhood
of Maintenance of Way Employees (BMWE), except their Conrail
Federations, were involved in the proceedings before PEB 219. The
BMWE Federations representing maintenance of way employees of
Conrail, however, elected not to participate in the national
bargaining and were not party to the proceedings before PEB 219.
The unresolved contract issues before us between Conrail and
the BMWE cover some of the same subjects as those considered by PEB
219. The recommendations of PEB 219, as reviewed by the Special
Board, are in effect between the carriers and their organizations,
either as the basis of settlements or as enacted by Congress. They
cover such matters as wages, health benefits, skill differentials,
incidental
work
rule,
subcontracting,
moratorium,
and
successorship.
Conrail's position is that the findings and recommendations of
PEB 219 constitute a pattern; it offered to settle on that basis
with the BMWE. More favorable recommendations to the BMWE would in
its view be unfair to the vast majority of employees working under
the PEB 219 recommendations, would seriously disturb morale and
orderly labor relations by establishing materially different
conditions of employment among employees similarly situated, cause
"leapfrogging, me-tooism, and whipsawing" by other labor
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organizations as they competed with each other for superior
benefits, and inevitably result in destabilization of parity
arrangements,
historical
differentials,
and
established
relationships.
Conrail claims that there is a history of so-called pattern
bargaining in the railroad industry pursuant to which substantive
agreements covering significant groups of employees have been
replicated for other employees similarly situated. Additionally,
Conrail argues that on the merits, there is no justification for
recommendations favorable to the BMWE that exceed those proposed by
PEB 219 on the same issues.
The BMWE views this proceeding differently. It rejects the
pattern theory and asserts that it is entitled to a de novo inquiry
and a new set of recommendations by this Board on the merits of
each of the issues in dispute. It emphasizes its lawful right to
sever its bargaining from other rail labor organizations.
It
disagrees with the view that it is bound by the recommendations of
PEB 219, in whose proceedings it did not participate.
In short, the BMWE disputes the alleged history of pattern
applications in the railroad industry and rejects the claim that
the recommendations of PEB 219 themselves constitute a pattern. It
argues that a pattern does not emerge from terms and conditions
which, rather than being voluntarily negotiated, were imposed by
legislative fiat on a majority of the affected work force.
Instead, it claims that based on their job duties, skills and
hazards, as well as on relevant economic data and occupational
comparisons, the employees it represents are entitled to the
benefits and conditions sought irrespective of what PEB 219
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recommended as the basis of settlement for others. Finally, the
BMWE denies, for the previously stated reasons, that any such
results on the merits would be destabilizing.
That the BMWE employees on Conrail were not party to the
proceedings before PEB 219 is reason enough to conclude that the
recommendations of that Board do not constitute an automatically
binding pattern on them. As a present reality, however, effective
for a substantial majority of the industry's employees, those
recommendations cannot be ignored in deciding the issues affecting
the BMWE and Conrail.
The economic bargaining relationships between Conrail and the
BMWE, between Conrail and the other rail labor organizations, and
the hierarchical structure among the members of all the
organizations make the recommendations of PEB 219 relevant and
material. Certainly, the BMWE was aware, when it elected to stay
out of the PEB 219 proceedings, that specific findings of fact and
recommendations .would be made that dealt with the identical issues
now in dispute between Conrail and the BMWE, and that those
recommendations would apply to the majority of the unionized work
force.
We consider it critical to the public interest that labor
relations and collective bargaining on the nation's railroads be
fair, stable, and reasonably consistent. Conversely, we believe
that political competition between and among unions for supremacy
of benefits, with its ineluctably destabilizing consequences, is
damaging to the public interest.
Therefore, because the recommendations of PEB 219 are now in
effect for most of the unionized employees in the railroad
industry, we conclude that significant variations for the BMWE-
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represented employees on Conrail that change previously linked or
stabilized economic and work relationships with other rail
employees would produce the destabilization that we think must be
avoided. We recognize, however, that exceptions may be made in
special, compelling circumstances.
The foregoing reasons justify, in our opinion, treating the
recommendations of PEB 219 as presumptively applicable to the BMWE
and Conrail in this case, whether or not they are characterized as
a pattern.
The presumption, however, is a rebuttable one. We
shall weigh all the factors in each issue before us, including
persuasive reasons, if any, why a given PEB 219 recommendation
should not be made applicable to BMWE-represented employees on
Conrail. Ultimately, we must make each decision on the basis of
the total record before us.
VI.

ISSUES, POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. WAGES
PEB 219 made the following general wage recommendations:
1.
2.
3.

4.

5.

A lump-sum payment of $2000 to each employee upon the
signing of the agreement.
A 3-percent lump-sum payment effective July 1, 1991.
A 3-percent lump-sum payment effective July 1, 1992,
which is to be considered as a cost-of-living adjustment
and not part of the wage base.
A 3-percent lump-sum payment effective January 1, 1993,
which is to be considered as a cost-of-living adjustment
and not part of the wage base.
A 3-percent general wage increase effective July 1, 1993.
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6.

A 3-percent lump-sum payment effective January 1, 1994,
which is to be considered as a cost-of-living adjustment
and not part of the wage base.

7.
8.

A 4-percent general wage increase effective July I, 1994.
A 2-percent lump-sum payment effective January 1, 1995,
which is to be considered as a cost-of-living adjustment
and not part of the wage base.
A cost-of-living adjustment for each 6-month period,
beginning July 1, 1995, based upon the COLA formula which
has previously been utilized by the parties.

9.

The BMWE wage proposal is as follows:
1.

2.

3.
4.

General increases in all basic rates of pay in accordance
with the following schedule:
July 1, 1988
4 percent
July 1, 1989
4 percent
July 1, 1990
4 percent
July 1, 1991
3 percent
July 1, 1992
3 percent
July 1, 1993
3 percent
Additional quarterly adjustments in all rates of pay
commencing January, 1992, by application of an automatic
cost-of-living escalator clause based on a formula
providing a 1-cent increase in hourly rates for each .3point rise in the CPI-W (1967 = 100).
Elimination of reduced entry rates.
A one-time adjustment for MW repairmen to bring their
rates up to that for a Class I Machine Operator.

Conrail offers the same increases recommended by PEB 219,
except that it proposes that the first three-percent general
increase not be effective until the date of its new agreement with
the BMWE.
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BMWE Position
The BMWE contends that its wage proposal is designed primarily
to recover the loss in real wages the Conrail employees it
represents have consistently sustained since 1978. The BMWE also
points out that the Consumer Price Index (CPI) varies by region,
and that in the northeast region, the center of Conrail's
operations, the cost of living is higher than the average for the
country. According to the BMWE, pay rates for key maintenance of
way positions are now substantially below going rates for
comparable and often identical jobs in other industries. Thus, in
a comparison with 14 selected outside industry agreements, the BMWE
found that the average increase in those industries between July 1,
1988, and January 1, 1992, was 14 percent, whereas Conrail
employees, including those represented by the BMWE, received
nothing.
Similarly, the BMWE asserts that in respect of both
current wage rates and past wage progress, Conrail workers are
substantially below their commuter rail and urban transit rail
counterparts.
Far from being in economic distress, the BMWE asserts, Conrail
has led the financial recovery of Class I railroads during the
1980s, and particularly since 1988, when the carriers and the major
organizations last reached a contract through direct negotiations.
According to the BMWE, moderate increases in labor costs coupled
with historic productivity increases have caused unit labor costs
on Conrail to drop precipitously since 1980. The BMWE contends
that unit cost control affected price competition and freight rate
compression, and produced a stable operating revenue trend over the
past 10 years.
The consequent increase in net income lifted
Conrail's profitability to record levels and turned it into one of
the nation's most profitable railroads.
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Conrail Position
Conrail declares that the BMWE wage proposal is unacceptable
for two basic reasons.
First, it would place a tremendous
financial burden on Conrail (approximately $52 million in wages and
payroll taxes over the entire contract period) in excess of the
cost of the PEB 219 recommendations, assuming that there will be no
change in present manning levels. Second, Conrail contends that
applying the PEB 219 wage recommendations to its employees
represented by the BMWE is fair; it preserves equity between those
employees and other Conrail employees and between its maintenance
of way employees and their counterparts on other rail carriers.
Conrail asserts that its financial condition is not as strong
as the BMWE represents. It points out that it is not a big coal or
grain hauler, but tends to haul more truck-competitive freight.
According to Conrail, it is still not earning the cost of capital;
unless it can manage to do so, it will continue to shrink as it
liquidates assets. For example, from 1980 to the present, its
mileage has been reduced from 18,000 to 12,000 miles and its work
force from 80,000 to 12,000 employees.
The consequences of granting the BMWE's wage proposal, Conrail
alleges, would be to give a substantial advantage to its major rail
competitors, CSX Transportation Company and the Norfolk Southern
Corporation.
Moreover, its ability to reduce prices so as to
attract traffic away from trucks would be seriously impaired.
*

Recommendation
As is apparent from our comments in the introduction to this
Report, we think it inappropriate to treat this case as if it
existed in a vacuum.
We cannot ignore the fact that labor
organizations representing a majority of the employees in the
railroad industry recently participated in proceedings before PEB
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219, asked for general wage increases approximating what the BMWE
is proposing, sought to justify such increases with arguments quite
similar to those advanced by the BMWE in this case, and ultimately
accepted, or were statutorily bound by, the recommendations of PEB
219.
However compelling the evidence adduced by the BMWE in
support of its position may seem, if considered without regard to
what has occurred in the railroad industry in the past year, we are
bound to conclude that endorsement of its wage proposal would be
profoundly destabilizing to the present wage structure of the
railroad industry. We therefore decline to recommend it.
In keeping with the general approach we have taken in respect
of the wage issue in this case, we recommend that the parties adopt
the general wage and cost-of-living increases and time schedule for
such wage adjustments recommended by PEB 219. Achievement of the
wage stability the carriers advocate can be attained only by making
the first three-percent general increase effective on the same date
(July 1, 1991) as that applicable to the organizations covered by
the PEB 219 recommendations. We see no reason why the BMWE should
suffer any loss of retroactivity simply because it declined to
participate in the proceedings before PEB 219, which it had the
legal right to do.
B.

ENTRY RATES

BMWE Position
The BMWE seeks the elimination of entry rates.
It asserts
that the current five-year progression from 75 percent of the top
rates is not justified, that it establishes a
two-tier
compensation system victimizing those who suffer the worst
seasonality of employment, and that it subsidizes Conrail through
inadequate wages.
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Conrail Position
Conrail argues that the recommendations of PEB 219 on this
issue should be followed. PEB 219 recommended an exclusion from
this rule for foreman, mechanics, and production gang members
operating heavy,
self-propelled equipment requiring skill and
experience.
Conrail points out that that recommendation was
incorporated into the national BMWE settlement, which also provided
that any questions of coverage should be submitted to the Contract
Interpretation Committee.
Recommendation
BMWE employees in the highest-rated positions who work for
freight carriers other than Conrail have already been granted the
exclusion from wage progression sought by the organization in this
case. There is some merit, however, in applying lower entry rates
and wage progression to those working in lower-paying positions, in
as much as they are likely to be less productive until they master
the full range of their job duties. Nevertheless, we find a fiveyear progression based upon a 75 percent hiring rate to be
inequitable in the light of both the lesser-skilled nature of the
work involved and the greater burdens seasonality of employment
imposes upon them. Accordingly, we recommend that the exclusion
from rate progression accorded by PEB 219 be extended to BMWE
employees of Conrail, and that those not covered by that exclusion
be granted a two-year rate progression commencing at 90 percent and
advancing to 95 percent at the end of the first year and to full
rate at the end of the second year.
C.

RATE OF PAY FOR MAINTENANCE OF WAY REPAIRMAN

BMWE Position
The BMWE proposes raising the hourly rate of the Maintenance
of Way Repairman ($13.63) to that of Class One Operator ($14.06).
-13-

It asserts that the increase is justified by the increasing
complexity of the machinery for which these employees are
responsible.
It argues that they must be qualified in skilled
repairing and welding, file hazardous material reports for the
Department of Transportation, make highway rail inspections, repair
and maintain company trucks, and the like. It notes that they work
adjacent to IAM mechanics who do the same work at $14.29 per hour,
and that granting this proposal would help to reduce the disparity
in compensation between the crafts for performing the same tasks.
In its oral presentation before this Board, the BMWE further
proposed the introduction of a standard tool list, and that
Maintenance of Way Repairmen be compensated for the purchase of
such tools, and for their repair or replacement if they are broken
or stolen while being used for the carrier. The BMWE asserts that
these tools are extremely expensive and that the present
requirement that Repairmen purchase them at their own cost
constitutes a subsidy to the employer of thousands of dollars and
is an unfair condition of continued employment.
Conrail Position
Conrail denies any justification for a rate increase for the
Maintenance of Way Repairman, contending that there is no
correlation between the skill requirement of repairing equipment
and the skill and dexterity requirements for operating the complex
units. It notes that the Repairman, unlike the Class One Operator,
need not know track geometry or other technical aspects associated
with the operation of the machine, and argues that because the two
classifications are not comparable, the proposal should be denied.
On the issue of tool allowance, Conrail asserts that mechanic
purchase and ownership of tools is a universally accepted practice,
that the carrier supplies all specialized tools, and that adoption
-14-

of the BMWE proposal would not only be costly, but would also be
subject to great abuse, because of unsupported claims of theft or
loss, and the additional temptation of using such carrier-supplied
tools for the employees private business use.
Recommendation
The BMWE proposal to increase the rate of Maintenance of Way
Repairman to that of Machine Operator Class One fails to recognize
the differences in level of skill and responsibility

for the

respective classifications. That a comparable classification in
the IAM unit is compensated at a higher rate does not justify the
BMWE's claim in this case.

Its proposal should be withdrawn.

On the issue of tool allowance, the widely-prevailing practice
among mechanics regardless of industry is that they purchase their
own tools. Only by adherence to that practice is it possible to
assure that mechanics exercise due care in using and protecting the
tools.
In the absence of persuasive evidence in this case to
support the organization's claim that Conrail should depart from
that prevailing practice, we recommend that the BMWE proposal be
withdrawn.
D.

HEALTH AND WELFARE

BMWE Position
BMWE proposes that there be a plan solely for BMWE-represented
employees of Conrail and their dependents, separate and apart from
the National Plan, and funded entirely by Conrail. Alternatively,
it seeks creation of a subgroup consisting of BMWE-represented
employees and their dependents maintained within the National Plan
for separate experience-rating purposes, again funded by Conrail.
It rejects employee sharing of any increases in Plan costs.
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Conrail Position
Conrail asserts that the National Plan, as changed pursuant to
the national BMWE settlement based on the recommendations of PEB
219, including the recommendation that the Plan continue to be
experience-rated as a whole, should apply to Conrail employees
represented by the BMWE.
It argues that based on the
recommendations of PEB 219 and the national BMWE settlement,
Conrail employees represented by BMWE should share in increases in
Plan costs, in an amount equal to the lesser of 25 percent of yearto-year increases or 50 percent of applicable COLAs (after
crediting employees with the cash reserves used to pay current
benefits in 1993 and 1994).
Recommendation
This is an issue that should be resolved on the basis of the
recommendation of PEB 219, as clarified by the Special Board, with
the changes applicable to the other organizations. To do otherwise
would create different health and welfare plans among the employees
of Conrail, with different cost contributions. The disaffiliation
of the BMWE-represented employees could detract from the fiscal
vitality of the National Plan, with the attendant risk that
benefits, experience-ratings, and costs may differ. We think this
would be destabilizing both to the relationship among those
employees and their representative organizations and to labor
relations between Conrail and those organizations.
The BMWE proposal should be withdrawn, and the
Conrail
proposal, based on the PEB 219 recommendation, including the
sharing of cost increases, should be adopted.
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E.

SUBCONTRACTING

BMWE Position
The BMWE proposes that subcontracting be barred without the
written concurrence of the General Chairman.
current provision for providing

It asserts that the

notice to the organization, with

recommendation thereafter, has not resulted in Conrail's rescinding
its commitment to subcontract. It argues that maintenance of way
employees have the skills to do roofing, blacktopping, and culvert
cleaning, and that even if Conrail currently lacks the necessary
eguipment for completing such tasks, bargaining-unit employees
could do the work on either rented or purchased equipment.
Conrail Position
Conrail contends it is essential that it continue to retain
control over subcontracting without being subject to a BMWE veto.
It asserts that contracting out work utilizing highly technological
equipment and skills is the most cost-efficient method of handling
such complex, capital-intensive tasks; that the owners of such
equipment require its operation by their own personnel; and that
purchase of such equipment by Conrail would entail an enormous
capital

investment

while

precluding

technologically advanced equipment.

access

to

ever

more

It urges the Board to follow

the precedent of PEB 219 and permit continuation of the current
arrangements governing subcontracting.
Recommendation
The existing practice of subcontracting provides the employer
with access to the latest technological equipment without the need
to expend substantial capital funds.

Although some of the tasks

currently being subcontracted might fall within the competence of
bargaining-unit
better
suited

personnel, the present procedures would appear
to
determine
the
appropriateness
of
such
-17-

subcontracting than would the requirement of General Chairman
concurrence for any subcontracting. The BMWE proposal should be
withdrawn.
F.

SUCCESSORSHIP

BMWE Position
The BMWE proposes a rule requiring Conrail to condition any
sale or lease of any portion of the railroad upon provision for
successorship by the organization as bargaining representative, and
continuation of collective bargaining agreements for the benefit of
employees who are employed by such successor.
It would provide
lifetime compensation protection to affected employees if the
acquirer does not comply with the foregoing. It asserts that such
benefit protection has been an accepted condition of such
transactions since the Washington Job Protection Act of 1936, and
that it is essential to protect employees against efforts to
undermine unionization and union benefits through the creation of
wholly-owned subsidiaries that secure trackage without labor
protection and then transfer the same to nonunion entities. It
asserts that the implementation of this kind of rule with Conrail
is the only viable protection against the ICC's standards, which
would permit such undermining of traditional union rights and
protections.
Conrail Position
Conrail contends that the BMWE position is not bargainable
because the ICC has jurisdiction to approve line sales and leases
if it believes them to be in the public interest.
The ICC
position, it continues, is that it will enforce such protection
agreements
as are voluntarily reached through collective
bargaining. It urges this Board to follow the precedent of PEB 219
in declining to impose such an agreement on the parties. It argues
-18-

that Conrail, like other carriers, must be free to transfer and
sell its property without the imposition of job protection
impediments that would bar such transfers and sales while
increasing property abandonments. The NMB, it asserts, provides
the appropriate procedures for employees on such successor
properties to determine their choice, if any, of bargaining
representative, and that the BMWE proposal contravenes the accepted
principles of the Railway Labor Act.
Recommendation
We find that this issue is properly subject to collective
bargaining.
However, as virtually no other carrier has a
successorship protective clause in its agreements, we find that it
would be profoundly destabilizing to recommend such a clause to the
organization requesting it.
G.

MINIMUM WORKFORCE

BMWE Position
The BMWE proposes that each seniority district, subdepartment,
and classification be manned by a minimum complement of maintenance
of way employees; that such employees be provided 12 months' pay;
that a 30 percent cap be placed on the portion of the force used in
production units; and that there be no reduction of minimum forces
through attrition or abandonment or line sales except through a
buyout of $100,000 per employee. It argues that there is clear
evidence of the need for Conrail to devote greater attention to
maintenance and upkeep of its right of way; that the BMWE has lost
5,000 jobs on Conrail since 1982; that maintenance of way employees
suffer more from seasonal layoffs than do other crafts, with only
50 percent of them working year-round and 20 percent working less
than six months, and that there is a clear tradition and
recognition of the importance of job protection for displaced or
-19-

dismissed

railroad

employees.

It contends

that

the

current

procedure
for
partial
compensation
through
supplemental
unemployment benefits creates an undue hardship on workers and
their families, placing some among those eligible for food stamps,
and that Conrail has the need and ability to fund the retention of
a permanent workforce.
Conrail Position
Conrail contends that the BMWE workforce stabilization
proposal would double its annual wage and fringe benefit cost; that
the minimum workforce assignments prescribed by the BMWE would
necessitate hiring 3,989 more employees than it has at present;
that work requirements, system seniority restrictions, and
seasonality impediments would force it to compensate idle
employees; and that conformity to the PEB 219 recommendations would
provide a reasonable level of protection for employees without
threatening the carrier's survival.
Recommendation
Although the evidence shows that Conrail can make more
effective use of its workforce by devoting.more manpower to both
maintenance and production work and can place its seasonal
employees on a more secure economic footing by endeavoring to
lengthen their annual periods of production, we do not agree that
the solution to those problems rests in providing guaranteed yearround employment to its workforce at present, let alone increased
levels of staffing.
The seasonal nature of maintenance of way work cannot be
denied. Although half the workforce is employed on a year-round
basis, the other half suffers not only reduced periods of annual
employment, but also resultant economic hardship for themselves and
their families.
As many of these drift into other employment,
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Conrail reduces its pool of qualified employees. Inasmuch as the
evidence shows that the average workyear for Conrail's maintenance
of way employees is 9.6 months, we believe it appropriate to
minimize the extent to which shorter-term employees are employed.
This issue was addressed by PEB 219 for the BMWE and the other
freight carriers. We believe it would be destabilizing to depart
from the recommendation for a guarantee of six months' work and the
supplemental unemployment benefit referred to therein.
H.

PRODUCTION UNITS

BMWE Position
The BMWE proposes that employees assigned to production units
engaged in tie renewal, rail renewal, surfacing, and undercutting
be afforded meals and lodging during the workweek. It asserts that
Conrail has relied on the technicality of production jobs being
assigned to a fixed headquarters to avoid the payment of away-fromhome expenses to employees who are, in fact, working remote
distances from their homes. The BMWE would bar the designation of
a fictional headquarters point to avoid such payments.
Conrail Position
Conrail asserts that under Rule 24(a), employees housed in
camp cars or company-provided lodging facilities are furnished
three meals per day, and that under Rule 18, Sec. 2, employees
taken off assigned territory to work elsewhere will also be
provided meals and lodging.
However, such benefits are not
provided to employees who customarily carry midday lunch and are
not held away from their assigned territory for an unreasonable
time beyond the evening meal hour.
It argues that the only
production unit with employees who are not entitled to meals and
lodging during the workweek is one with a fixed headquarters, a
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situation that occurred only twice in more than three months in
1991. It asserts that employees who work such units do so of their
own volition. It represents that the daily cost for such housing
and feeding would be approximately $35 per employee, and points out
that it could arguably be applied as well to support forces
normally assigned to the territory in which a production unit is
working. It urges that the proposal be denied.
Recommendation
The evidence shows that employees who are in production units
are provided lodging and meals in most cases.
However, the
evidence also shows a practice of the carrier assigning employees
to headquarters which are moved from time to time, resulting in the
production units assigned to those transitory headquarters being
forced to stay away from home in order to meet their employment
responsibilities. We believe that assigning them as crews based at
fixed headquarters ignores the reality of the extended periods of
their being required by the distance of work sites to stay away
from home, and incurring the costs associated therewith.
In the light of these occurrences,

and the evidence that

production crews do, in fact, remain away from home under such
circumstances, we recommend the payment of a $35-per day allowance
to production crews in cases in which the location of their
headquarters changes from that in effect at the time of bidding.
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I.

COMBINING AND REALIGNING SENIORITY DISTRICTS

Conrail Position
Conrail proposes that the Board adopt the recommendations of
PEB 219 in giving the carrier the option to realign and combine
seniority districts. It asserts that the present districts are too
many in number and do not match the management territories used to
operate the system. It contends that the districts must be changed
to

conform

to

the

lines

of

the

predecessor

railroads

now

encompassed within its larger transportation system.
BMWE Position
The BMWE contends that the present system of districts was
agreed upon in 1982; that there is no justification for adopting
the recommendation of PEB 219; that there has been no demonstration
that the Conrail proposal would result in cost savings; and that
any problem of imbalance between work and number of employees in
seniority districts can be addressed by allowing voluntary transfer
of employees. It objects to Conrail's plan to establish a companywide seniority system under which employees would be forced to
compete on a system^wide basis to maintain and hold jobs. Such a
practice,

it

continues,

would

reduce

the

value of seniority

accumulated on smaller rosters of individual seniority districts,
dislocate employees, uproot families, and move homes.
that the proposal be denied.

It urges

Recommendation
After

reviewing

the

evidence

on

this

issue,

the

Board

concludes that we lack sufficient information to redraw regional or
district lines. Accordingly, we recommend that the parties develop
a procedure for dealing with this issue similar to that recommended
by PEB 219, namely, that if Conrail desires to combine or realign
seniority districts, it should give 30 days' written notice to the
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affected employees and the BMWE.
If the parties are unable to
reach agreement within 90 days of serving that notice, the matter
may be submitted to arbitration in accordance with a procedure
mutually agreeable to them.
J.

REGIONAL AND SYSTEM-WIDE GANGS

Conrail Position
Conrail asserts its need for relief on regional gangs to
permit it fully to utilize expensive and specialized rail
production machinery over an extended production season. It argues
that continuity of gang consists would enhance gang productivity.
It states that artificial territorial barriers slow work and
increase cost by reducing employee productivity, create manpower
shortages and duplications and disrupt employment and program
continuity.
BMWE Position
The BMWE claims that the carrier proposal would require
employees to work the entire length of the Eastern and Western
halves of the Conrail territory in order to hold a production job,
and that the need to travel such great distances would curtail the
employees' ability to return home on a rest day. It would, it
continues, also reduce the likelihood of successful bids on
positions near home. In the absence of any persuasive showing of
operational need, the BMWE urges that the proposal be denied.
Recommendation
Regional and system-wide gangs are justified on highly
technical and expensive equipment being operated by a large number
of skilled employees. We therefore recommend that these gangs be
used regionally and system-wide. We expect the carrier to share
the work among all qualified employees.
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K.

WORKWEEK AND REST DAYS

Conrail Position
Conrail requests authorization to designate any two days in a
seven-day week as rest days; to schedule work on the basis of four
10-hour days per seven-day week or other compressed schedule; and
to extend the number of days that may be worked consecutively
during which period employees would accumulate rest days.
It
asserts that the national BMWE settlement gives carriers greater
flexibility to schedule weekend work and that it should be
permitted comparable relief.
BMWE Position
The BMWE argues that many factors of the national settlement
are already included in the parties' present agreement.
It
contends that the concessionary rules recommended by PEB 219 grant
the carriers freedom to vary workweeks without a showing of
operational need and constitute an erosion of the basic principles
which govern present agreements of all nonoperating crafts. It
concludes that abandonment of the current Monday-Friday workweek
except in cases' of operational need would destroy the forty-hour
work rule granted by PEB 66 in 1949.
Recommendation
Four 10-hour work days would permit the carrier more fully to
utilize some gangs.
Therefore, we recommend that Conrail's
proposal be adopted, with the understanding that at least one rest
day be on a Saturday or Sunday. The normal workweek should be five
consecutive days, with Saturday or Sunday off. The carrier cannot
satisfactorily perform necessary work with all employees having
Saturday and Sunday off.
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L.

STARTING TIME

Conrail Position
Conrail seeks the PEB 219 standard in starting times for
production crews between 4:00 a.m. and 11:00 a.m., with 36 hour
notice of changes and without- changes for five consecutive days.
PEB 219 did not permit production crews or regular assignments to
have a midnight to 4:00 a.m. starting time.
It contends that
comparative service requirements make it increasingly critical that
maintenance of way work be performed at times, that do not disrupt
train schedules, so that the carrier can perform up to shippers'
standards
for on-time delivery in the highly competitive
transportation industry.
It asserts that it has sophisticated
cumputer programs to schedule efficient interfacing of train
operations and maintenance work if allowed effectively to
coordinate maintenance schedules without penalties when rail
traffic is light. The present starting time window of 6:00 a.m. to
8:00 a.m. does not allow the carrier the necessary flexibility to
accomplish its goals with the requisite large blocks of
uninterrupted time relief granted to other carriers by PEB 219.
BMWE Position
The BMWE seeks to retain the 6:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m starting
time (5:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m. from May 1-September 30) or otherwise
by agreement.
It notes that it has agreed to many adaptations,
that the proposed expansion of starting times is onerous; that it
would constitute a substantial decline in working conditions,
restricting employees time to travel home and increasing risks of
injury and accident at night. It urges that because the Conrail
proposal has no demonstrable need and destroys negotiated
conditions it should be denied.
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Recommendation
The intensity of traffic results in the work of gangs being
interrupted and a resultant loss of substantial working time.
Maintenance of Conrail's competitive position requires that it have
greater flexibility in fixing starting times. Therefore, the Board
recommends adherence to the recommendations of PEB 219 and the
interpretations thereunder as necessary for the carrier to operate
in an efficient and economic manner.
M.

WORKSITE REPORTING

Conrail Position
Conrail contends that pay time for BMWE employees working at
any jobsite away from their assigned headquarters, or for those who
have no assigned headquarters, should begin and end at the
worksite instead of when reporting to headquarters or camp unit, as
at present. The carrier points out that.unlike virtually all other
employees, BMWE production employees away from home are paid for
nonproductive time spent commuting between the worksite and their
lodgings each day. Conrail proposes to end this category of pay
for time not worked.
The carrier notes that PEB 219 recommended modification of the
rule so that pay time commences at the worksite or the designated
reporting site, provided there is adequate off-highway parking at
the site.
Conrail also notes that the recommendation further
provides compensation for commuting time over 15 minutes both to
and from the worksite on the first day of change in its location.
BMWE Position
The BMWE alleges that Conrail informed it that time paid for
traveling to the jobsite currently averages about two hours per
day. The organization contends this claim is incredible because
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the carrier has the flexibility provided in the 1982 Rules
Agreement substantially to reduce any travel time.
The BMWE
further points out that there are 10 additional locations which are
adequate for maintenance gang headquarters. The Union points out
that Management production has the flexibility in the New Jersey
seniority district to have camp car employees no further than
approximately six miles from the jobsite.
The BMWE asserts that, from time to time, maintenance of way
employees have to travel a long distance from their homes to a
motel or a camp car, and then they must deadhead from that
temporary lodging to the jobsite.
It argues that the proposed
changes would eliminate the incentive to keep camp cars close to
the work site, and that because employees come to work clean they
should be paid until they have cleaned up at the end of their
shifts at headquarters or camp cars.
Recommendation
The Board has reviewed the findings of PEB 219 and all the
evidence submitted by Conrail and the BMWE. It recommends that the
BMWE production gangs be paid travel time from camp cars and motels
to and from the worksite except for 15 minutes going and 15 minutes
returning. This should induce the carrier to designate worksite
reporting locations which are more convenient to the place of work.
N.

VACATION RULE

BMWE Position
The BMWE proposes that full-time union officials be allowed to
accrue service for vacation eligibility, rather than having
vacation entitlement frozen at the levels in effect when they went
to work for the organization. It would make the benefit applicable
to any employee who has been on union leave of absence since July
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1, 1988, retroactive to the date such leave began. It argues that
the current practice imposes an unfair financial impediment on
those opting to work for the BMWE, and discourages such activity.
It notes that the employees affected would still be required to
achieve eligibility for vacation on their return to regular
employment, and that the proposal would affect only the quantum of
vacation entitlement.
The BMWE further proposes that employees be entitled to take
their vacations in one-day increments. It declares that such a
benefit is desirable for employees who need to attend to personal
affairs from time to time, noting that the benefit is currently
provided to employees on commuter lines.
Conrail Position
Conrail objects to both proposals. It argues that the unionbusiness credit would force Conrail to reward an employee with
vacation credits even though it gains no benefits from the
employee's labor.
It asserts the proposal is for a gratuitous
advantage and would urge its denial, as well as the denial of the
claim for retroactivity.
On the issue of the daily vacation increments, Conrail asserts
that the December 17, 1941, National Vacation Agreement does not
contemplate taking vacation in less than weekly increments, and
this is essential to facilitate the carrier's scheduling of work
with expectation of full crews being available for the full
workweek.
Recommendation
The BMWE proposal for continued accumulation of vacation
credit while on leave of absence for union business would provide
appropriate recognition of the employees' seniority with the
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carrier and place them on a vacation level approximating that of
their peers who did not go on union leaves of absence.
Because
Conrail has recognized the continued seniority and employment
status of employees on union leave of absence, and because
entitlement to such vacation in any particular year is dependent on
the employee's fulfillment of the work requirements for eligibility
that year, we recommend that the benefit be adopted, but without
the retroactivity proposed by the BMWE.
On the issue of single-day vacation increments, we do not
believe the BMWE has presented a persuasive case.
Vacation,
particularly for those who spend such extended periods away from
home, should be taken for its avowed purpose: to provide extended
periods of rest and rehabilitation with families, at home, and away
from work. Employees currently have available two personal days
for purposes addressed in the BMWE proposal. Vacation periods, we
believe, should be confined to five-day increments.
The BMWE
proposal on this issue should be withdrawn.
0.

WORKING FOREMEN

BMWE Position
The BMWE urges restriction of foremen to supervisory duties
and elimination of that part of the scope rule which states that
the "foreman works with employees assigned under his supervision."
The BMWE takes the position that Conrail has stretched the
flexibility in the scope rule far beyond the intentions of the
parties when they negotiated the rule. The organization accuses
Conrail of undermining the seniority system by transferring job
duties to the foreman classification.
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Conrail Position
Conrail contends that if the BMWE proposal were adopted, it
would be forced to add a variety of employees, such as vehicle
operators, machine operators, and trackman. Conrail estimates the
cost would be approximately $30 million.
Recommendation
The Board has reviewed the testimony and evidence submitted by
the BMWE and finds no basis for altering the traditional concept of
foremen as working formen. To do so would restrict the number of
employees in the classification, as well as access of bargaining
unit employees to the greater authority and better wages that the
present foreman classification provides. The proposal should be
withdrawn.
P.

SAFETY

BMWE Position
The BMWE proposes that Conrail enter into an agreement with it
concerning workplace safety. The proposal includes creation of a
joint labor-management health and safety committee, which would
meet monthly and make inspections of the railroad each month.
Under the proposal, Conrail would pay BMWE-represented employees
for their committee work.
Conrail Position
Conrail contends that the BMWE proposal is a more detailed
version of the safety program that the national BMWE proposed to
PEB 219.
On that basis Conrail urges that this Board should
recommend that Conrail and the BMWE adopt a national settlement in
all respects, including a moratorium on proposals regarding safety
programs. Further, Conrail points to the fact that in mid-1988 it
introduced a new safety program, based on joint labor/management
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participation and cooperation involving all crafts. Conrail states
that this program has produced measurable increases in employee
safety, particularly for BMWE employees, whose injury rate is only
about 25 percent of what it was in 1988.
Recommendation
The Board has studied and considered all of the evidence
submitted by both parties. We are of the opinion that the evidence
is insufficient to justify recommending any modification of the
present safety program.
Therefore, we recommend that the BMWE
proposal be withdrawn.
Q.

SAFETY SHOES

BMWE Position
The BMWE proposes the payment of $200 in January of each year
to reimburse the employees for the cost of safety shoes for the
year. It asserts that the figure represents the true cost of such
shoes and that the $30 per year currently provided for the purchase
of two pairs of shoes is inadequate.
Conrail Position
Conrail objects to the BMWE proposal on the grounds that it is
merely a cash advance, with no correlation to the cost of the
shoes, and that it constitutes an increase of well over 500 percent
beyond the present allowance.
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Recommendation
We believe the present allowance of $30 for two pairs of
safety shoes is inadequate in light of cost increases since that
figure was agreed upon. An increase in the allowance to $60 per
year for the purchase of two pairs of safety shoes is more
reasonable. We recommend accordingly.
R.

MEAL PERIODS

BMWE Position
The BMWE proposes a first meal period between the fourth and
fifth hour of the advertised tour of duty to stabilize and
regularize the employees' workday by providing a regular meal
period without an inordinately long unbroken period of work. It
also seeks a second meal period in conjunction with overtime work
at such time as would prevent the carrier from manipulating
overtime work for its avoidance.
The BMWE asserts that a
regularized meal period at the fourth hour of work is reasonable in
light of the physical exertion and exposure to the elements which
characterizes maintenance of way work. It argues that employees,
are entitled to a reasonable break for rest as well as eating, and
that the three-hour window between the fourth and seventh hours
set forth in the PEB 219 recommendations is an unfair deprivation
of such a break.
Conrail Position
Conrail asserts that the existing meal period between the
fourth and sixth hours should be retained; that the one-hour window
proposed by the BMWE is extremely small and disruptive to its work
and scheduling demands.
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Recommendation
The BMWE proposal for a lunch period between the fourth and
fifth hour of the advertised tour of duty is, we believe,
unreasonably short to accommodate the scheduling of work so that
all employees are able to benefit from it. We believe that the
scheduling of meals between the fourth and sixth hour of the tour
is a more reasonable time period to schedule employees so that they
can benefit from it. We recommend that an additional meal period
be provided for those on overtime assignment five hours after their
lunch meal.
S.

TRAVEL ALLOWANCE

BMWE Position
The BMWE proposes an increase in the weekend travel allowance
from the current $6.00 per trip for Division Units and $7.50 per
trip for Inter Regional Units to $25 per trip for Division Units
and $40 per trip for Inter Regional Units. It asserts that its
proposal would more fully compensate the actual out of pocket
expense incurred by employees who must travel far from home to work
such jobs.
Conrail Position
Conrail asserts that the present level of allowance is
adequate; that the proposed increases of 316.6 percent and 433.3
percent are not justified by cost of living increases; and that the
payment of allowances is a benefit extended by Conrail to
maintenance of way employees provided under the agreements in
effect on the other railroads.
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Recommendation
Although there have been increases in the cost of travel since
the existing Rule-23 allowances were agreed upon, those increases
have not been sufficiently great to justify fully the augmented
allowances here sought by the BMWE. We recommend an increase in
the allowance to $10 per trip for Division Units and $12 per trip
for Inter Regional Units. These adjustments would make up for any
increased travel costs since the existing figures were negotiated.
T.

CAMP CAR

BMWE Position
The BMWE proposed an amendment to Rule 38 of the collective
bargaining agreement which would eliminate the top bunk in all camp
cars, and limit to a maximum of five the number of employees housed
in any single camp car, with penalties for violations. The BMWE
contends that at present 10 employees are required to live in a
total space of 9 feet 10 inches by 42 feet, or an approximate total
of 420 square feet. Further, it points out that such space is not
unencumbered, but includes bunks, toilets, sinks, showers, furnace,
etc.
The organization urges this Board to recommend a standard
that would provide 30 square feet of unencumbered space for each
employee.

Conrail Position
Conrail advises that the Federal Railway Administration (FRA)
is directly responsible for the enforcement of the Hours of Service
Act, which provides, among other things, that it is unlawful for a
railroad to house its employees in sleeping quarters which are not
safe, sanitary, and clean. Conrail states that the FRA has issued
an interpretation statement and guidelines, effective January 1,
1994, which include specific space requirements for each person,
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i.e., a minimum of 90 square feet in a facility where workers cook,
live, and sleep, 48 square feet of floor space for each occupant of
sleeping quarters, and window space equal to not less that 10
percent of the floor space for living quarters; also, there must be
at least 36 inches laterally and 30 inches end to end between each
bed or bunk. Conrail states that it is already in full compliance
with the above standards, as well as with the FRA standards
requiring all sleeper cars to be equipped with climate control
systems.
Conrail adds that if the proposed amendment went into
effect, it would be compelled to acquire 23 new camp cars, at a
cost of approximately $1.5 million. Finally, the carrier points
out that Rule 38(d) of the collective bargaining agreement provides
for joint inspection of the camp cars to correct any improper
conditions prior to the start of the production season.
Recommendation
The Board finds the evidence is insufficient to require
standards in excess of those set by the FRA, but does recommend
that if all the FRA's standards are not now in place, they should
be effectuated by January 1, 1993.
U.

MORATORIUM

We recommend a moratorium period for all matters on which
notices might properly have been served when the last moratorium
ended on July 1, 1988, to be in effect through January 1, 1995.
Notices for changes under Section 6 of the Railway Labor Act
accordingly may be served by any of the parties or another party no
earlier than November 1, 1994.
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VII.

ISSUES NOT DEALT WITH

Any and all issues in dispute before this Emergency Board on
which there are no recommendations, or which are not mentioned in
this Report, shall be deemed withdrawn.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

These recommendations represent our best judgement on the
merits and equities of the issues in dispute. They also represent
our estimate of a fair and realistic package of conditions,
benefits, and benefit changes that, as a totality, should provide
a basis for an acceptable, overall settlement.
We think it would be unrealistic and a costly exercise in
futility for all concerned if our total recommendations did not
take into consideration, as a critical ingredient, their
acceptability by the parties.
Nevertheless, we think it
impracticable to ask that the parties adopt these recommendations
unconditionally and without modification. As the Railway Labor Act
does not make them binding, we expect that the parties will make
adjustments as needed, or if necessary, subject them to major
revision. In any case, we hope that we have provided a well-marked
road map for good faith use by the parties in completing their
contracts through the process of free collective bargaining. We
express to the parties our profound thanks for the intelligent,
comprehensive, and professional presentation of their cases and for
their patience and cooperation with our procedures. We also
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acknowledge with thanks the assistance of Roland Watkins, the
Special Assistant to the Board.
Respectfully,

7 v~^-

Benjamin Aaron, Chairman

/A
Preston J. Moore, Member

Eric Js7 Schmertz , Membe

David P.Twbmey,Member/y

ArnoddM.
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Appendix "A1
EXECUTIVE ORDER

ESTABLISHING AN EMERGENCY BOARD TO INVESTIGATE A DISPUTE
BETWEEN THE CONSOLIDATED RAIL CORPORATION AND ITS EMPLOYEES
REPRESENTED BY THE BROTHERHOOD OF MAINTENANCE
OF WAY EMPLOYES
A dispute (NMB Case No. A-12260) exists between the
Consolidated Rail Corporation and its employees represented by
the Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes.
This dispute has not been adjusted under the provisions of
the Railway Labor Act, as amended (45 U.S.C. 151-138) ("the

Act") .
In the judgment of the National Mediation Board, this
dispute threatens substantially to interrupt interstate commerce
to a degree that would deprive various sections of the country
of essential transportation service.
NOW, THEREFORE, by the authority vested in me as President
by the Constitution and the laws of the United States, including
section 10 of the Act, it is hereby ordered as follows:
Section 1.

Creation of Emergency Board.

There is

created, effective April 3, 1992, a board of five members to
be appointed by the President to investigate this dispute.
No member shall be pecuniarily or otherwise interested in any
organization of railroad employees or any railroad carrier.

~"r.e

board shall perform its functions subject to the availability of
funds.
Sec. 2.

Report.

The board shall report to the President

on May 3, 1992, with respect to this dispute.
Sec. 3.

Maintaining Conditions.

As provided by section 10

of the Act, from the date of the creation of the board and for
30 days after the board has submitted its report to the
President, no change in the conditions out of which the dispute
arose shall be made by the railroads or the employees, except by
agreement of these parties.

2

Sec. 4.

Expiration.

The board shall terninate upon the

submission of the report provided for in section 2 of this
order.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
March 31,

1992.

REPORT
TO

THE PRESIDENT
BY

EMERGENCY BOARD
NO. 222

Submitted Pursuant
Dated
and
The Railway

to Executive Order No. 12796
March 31, 1992
Section 10 of
Labor Act, as Amended

Investigation of disputes between the National Railroad Passenger
Corporation and their employees represented by certain labor
organizations.
(National Mediation Board Case Nos.
A-12103, A-12198, A-12246, A-12263,
A-12268, A-12290, A-12291, A-12309,
A-12318, A-12391 and A-12467)
Washington, D.C.

May 28, 1992

Washington, O.C.
May 28, 1992

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:
On March 31, 1992, pursuant to Section 10 of the Railway Labor
Act, as amended, and by Executive Order 12796, you established an
Emergency Board to investigate disputes between the National
Railroad Passenger Corporation and their employees represented by
certain labor organizations.
The Board now has the honor to submit its Report and Recommendations to you concerning an appropriate resolution of the disputes
between the above parties.
Respectfully,

Benjamin Aaron, Chairman
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IV.

I.

CREATION OF THE EMERGENCY BOARD

Emergency Board No. 222 (the Board) was established by the
President pursuant to Section 10 of the Railway Labor Act, as
amended, 45 U.S.C. §160, and by Executive Order No. 12796. The
Board was ordered to investigate and report its findings and
recommendations regarding unadjusted disputes between the National
Railroad Passenger Corporation and their employees represented by
certain labor organizations.
Copy of the Executive Order is
attached as Appendix "A."
On April 3, 1992, the President appointed Benjamin Aaron of
Santa Monica, California, as Chairman of the Board. Preston J.
Moore of Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, Eric J. Schmertz of Riverdale,
New York, David P. Twomey of Quincy, Massachusetts, and Arnold M.
Zack of Boston, Massachusetts, were appointed as Members.
The
National Mediation Board appointed Roland Watkins, Esq., as Special
Assistant to the Board.
II.
A.

PARTIES TO THE DISPUTE

The National Railroad Passenger Corporation

The National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) provides
passenger service to 500 communities in 45 states nationwide.
There are 60,500 daily passengers and 253 daily trains on Amtrak's
nationwide route system; approximately half are passengers on the
Northeast Corridor which runs between Washington, D.C., and Boston,
Massachusetts.
Outside the corridor, Amtrak provides shortdistance passenger service to nearly 14,000 daily passengers in ten
corridors nationwide, four of which serve more than 1,000 passengers daily. In the largest of these, Amtrak serves 4,700 passengers traveling between Los Angeles and San Diego, California.
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In addition to passenger operations, Amtrak generates $50
million in annual revenue from mail and express service. The
majority of this service operates over the Northeast Corridor. The
United states Postal Service is the largest customer, representing
92 percent of its nonpassenger revenue.
B. The Labor Organizations
The disputes before the NMB involved ten labor organizations
that collectively represent most of Amtrak's employees. They are:
American Train Dispatchers Association (ATDA)
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers (BLE)
Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees (BMWE)
International Association of Machinists & Aerospace
Workers (IAM&AW)
International Brotherhood of Boilermakers and

Blacksmiths (IBB&B)
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW)
International Brotherhood of Firemen & Oilers (IBF&O)
Transport Workers Union (TWU)
Transportation Communications International Union (TCU)
United Transportation Union (UTU)
III.

ACTIVITIES OF THE EMERGENCY BOARD

The parties to the disputes met with the Emergency Board in
Washington, D.C., on April 6, 1992, to discuss procedural matters.
On April 16-22, 1992, the Board conducted hearings regarding
the issues in Washington, D.C. The parties were given full and
adequate opportunity to present oral testimony, documentary
evidence, and argument in support of their respective positions.
A formal record was made of the proceedings.
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The parties agreed to and the President approved an extension
of the time that the Emergency Board had to report its
recommendations until May 28, 1992.
The carrier presented its position through written statements
and oral testimony of W. Graham Clayton, Jr., Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer of Amtrak; David Z. Zurowsky, Senior Director Resource Management, Amtrak; John P. Prokopy, Director - Market
Planning, Amtrak; William C. Harsh, Jr., Mercer Management Consulting, Inc. ; John P. Lange, Assistant Vice President - Labor
Relations, Amtrak; Robert M. Burk, Chief Mechanical Officer,
Amtrak; John Livingood, Director-Labor Relations, Amtrak; Harold
Bongarten, Bongarten Associates; G.R. Simons, Bongarten Associates;
John J. Cunningham, Assistant Chief Engineer - Maintenance of Way
and Structures, Amtrak; George Daniels, Vice Chairman of the
National Railway Labor Conference; John S. Lightner, General
Superintendent-Transportation, Amtrak; and David S. Evans, National
Economic Research Associates, Inc. Amtrak was represented by Harry
A. Rissetto, Esq., of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius.
The TCU's presentation consisted of written statements and
oral testimony by Robert A. Scardelletti, International President,
TCU; Mitchell M, Kraus, Esq., General Counsel, TCU; Robert
Wojtowicz, TCU; William Fairchild, General President of the
Brotherhood of Railway Carmen Division, TCU; Joel Parker,
International Vice President, TCU; and James J. Kilgallon,
President of Ruttenberg, Kilgallon and Associates.
The TWU's presentation consisted of written statements and
oral testimony by George Leitz, President, Transport Workers Union
of America and Joseph Madison, TWU.
The organization was
represented by Asher Schwartz, Esq., of O'Donnell, Schwartz,
Glanstein & Rosen.
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The ATDA's presentation consisted of written statements and
oral testimony by Robert J. Irvin, President, ATDA; Harry Brandt,
Assistant Chief Train Dispatcher, Amtrak; and James J. Kilgallon.
The ATDA was represented by Michael S. Wolly, Esq., of Mulholland
& Hickey.
The IBEW's presentation consisted of written statements and
oral testimony by James A. McAteer, International Representative,
IBEW; Robert Wood, Director of Research and Economic Department,
IBEW; and Neil S. Gladstein, IBEW.
The lAM&AW's presentation consisted of written statements and
oral testimony by Robert Reynolds, General Chairman, IAM District
19; Thomas R. Roth, President of the Labor Bureau, Inc.; and Ivy
Silver, Principal at Leshner, Silver & Associates. The IAM&AW was
represented by Joseph Guerrieri, Jr., Esq., and John A. Edmond,
Esq., of Guerrieri, Edmond & James.
The BMWE's presentation consisted of written statements and
oral testimony by Jed Dodd, General Chairman, BMWE; Ivy Silver; and
Thomas R. Roth. The Organization was represented by William A.
Bon, Jr., Esq., General Counsel of the BMWE.
The BLE's presentation consisted of written statements and
oral testimony by Edward Dubroski, General Secretary/Treasurer, BLE
and Ronald E. Wiggins, General Chairman.
Pursuant to the request of the Board, on April 27, 1992, the
parties presented written lists of the issues which they deemed
still in dispute before the Board.
After the close of the hearings, the Board met in executive
sessions to prepare its Report and Recommendations. The entire
record considered by the Board consists of approximately eight
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hundred (800) pages of transcript and thirty-three hundred (3,300)
pages of exhibits.
IV.

HISTORY OF THE DISPUTE

On or about January 20, 1988, the IBEW, in accordance with
Section 6 of the Railway Labor Act, served notice on Amtrak of its
demand to change the existing collective bargaining agreements.
Amtrak served notice on or about April 1, 1988. The IBEW served an
additional notice on or about April 18, 1988. Amtrak, on October
14, 1988, applied to the National Mediation Board (NMB) for its
mediatory service. The application was docketed as NMB Case No. A12103.
Mediation was undertaken by Member Javits and Mediator
Richard A. Hanusz.
On or about April 1, 1988, Amtrak served notice on the BMWE.
The BMWE, on May 1, 1988, served notice on Amtrak of its demands
for changes in the existing agreements covering employees on the
Northeast Corridor portion of the Amtrak system.
The BMWE, on
December 6, 1988, applied to the NMB for its mediatory service.
The application was docketed as NMB Case No. A-12198.
On or about June 24, June 28 and July 25, 1988, the UTU served
notice on Amtrak.
Amtrak made counter proposals on or about
January 5, 1989. Amtrak, on April 20, 1989, applied to the NMB for
its mediatory services. The application was docketed as NMB Case
No. A-12246.
On or about April 1, 1988, Amtrak served notice on the BMWE of
its demands for changes in the provisions of the collective
bargaining agreements. The BMWE, on or about April 11, 1988 and
May 13, 1988, served its notices on Amtrak.
On May 30, 1989,
Amtrak applied to the NMB for its mediatory service. The application was docketed as NMB Case No. A-12263. Mediation was undertaken concurrently with NMB Case No. A-12198.
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Amtrak served notice on the Joint Council of Carmen, Helpers,
Coach Cleaners and Apprentices (composed of the TWU and the
Brotherhood of Railway Carmen division of the TCU) of its demand
for changes in the provisions of the collective bargaining
agreements on or about April 1, 1988. The Joint Council, on or
about May 18, 1988, served notice of its demands for changes. On
June 14, 1989, Amtrak and the Joint Council applied to the NMB for
its mediatory service. The application was docketed as NMB Case
No. A-12268.
The BLE served notice on or about June 30, 1988.
Amtrak
served a counterproposal on March 9, 1989. The BLE, on June 25,
1989, applied to the NMB for its mediatory services. The application was docketed as NMB Case No. A-12290.
Amtrak served the American Railway and Airway Supervisors
Association, a Division of the TCU, notice of its demands for
changes on or about April 1, 1988. ARASA/TCU served, on or about
May 30, 1988, a notice on Amtrak. On July 27, 1989, ARASA/TCU
applied to the NMB for its mediatory service. The application was
docketed as NMB Case No. A-12291.
Amtrak served notice on or about April 1, 1988, to the ATDA.
On or about June 1 and July 1, 1988, the ATDA served notices. The
ATDA, on September 27, 1989, applied for the NMB's mediatory
service. The application was docketed as NMB Case No. A-12309.
On or about January 20, 1988, the IAM&AW served notice on
Amtrak of its demand for a change in the collective bargaining
agreements. Amtrak, on or about April 18, 1988, served notice of
its demands for changes in the collective bargaining agreements.
The IAM&AW served an additional notice on or about April 18, 1988.
The IAM&AW, on November 3, 1989, applied to the NMB for its
mediatory service. The application was docketed as NMB Case No. A12318.
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Amtrak served notice on the IBF&O on or about April 1, 1988.
The organization served notices on May 19 and June 10, 1988 and
December 28, 1989. On May 22, 1990, the IBF&O applied to the NMB
for its mediatory services. The application was docketed as NMB
Case No. A-12391.
On or about April 1, 1988, Amtrak served notice on the IBB&B
of its demands. The IBB&B, on or about May 31, 1988, served its
notice on Amtrak. The IBB&B, on May 3, 1991, applied for the NMB's
mediatory service. The application was docketed as NMB Case NO. A12467.
All of the mediation efforts were unsuccessful.
On March 2, 1992, the NMB, in accordance with Section 5,
First, of the Railway Labor Act, offered all the organizations and
Amtrak the opportunity to submit their controversy to arbitration.
In NMB Case Nos. A-12198, A-12246, A-12263 and A-12290, Amtrak
declined the proffer of arbitration. The organizations declined
the proffer in NMB Case Nos. A-12291, A-12309, A-12318 and A-12467.
Amtrak and the respective organizations declined the proffer in NMB
Case Nos. A-12103 and A-12268. Accordingly, on March 4, 1992, the
NMB notified all the parties that it was terminating its mediatory
efforts.
On March 5, 1992, pursuant to Section 10 of the Railway Labor
Act, the NMB advised the President of the United States that, in
its judgment, the disputes threatened substantially to interrupt
interstate commerce to a degree such as to deprive various sections
of the country of essential transportation service.
The President, in his discretion, issued Executive Order 12796
on March 31, 1992, to create, effective April 3, 1992, this Board
to investigate and report concerning these disputes.
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The dispute in NMB Case No. A-12246, involving Amtrak and the
UTU, was settled by an agreement dated May 4, 1992. The IBF&O and
Amtrak, NMB Case No. A-12391, reached an agreement on April 3,
1992. On April 8, 1992, this Emergency Board was informed that the
membership of the IBB&B had ratified its tentative agreement
resolving the dispute in NMB Case No. A-12467. In NMB Case No. A12291, ARASA/TCU ratified its tentative agreement on April 15,
1992.
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V.

INTRODUCTION

The threshold question before us concerns the impact on this
Presidential Emergency Board 222 of the recommendations of PEB 219,
as enacted by Congress, and as reviewed by the Special Board.
The members of Emergency Boards 220 and 221 concluded that the
recommendations of PEB 219 were presumptively applicable to the
issues before those Boards, but rebuttable for persuasive reasons,
issue-by issue. The determinative standard was whether a variation
from what PEB 219 recommended would destabilize existing relationships between and among the parties involved in proceedings before
those two Boards.
That presumption was founded primarily on the fact that
organizations representing a majority of employees of carriers
appearing before Emergency Boards 220 and 221 are now bound by the
recommendations of PEB 219.
That is not the case with Amtrak. It has settled with a
number of organizations representing about half of its employees on
a wage package different from that recommended by PEB 219. By
doing so, it has introduced into the present case an "internal
model" different from that established by PEB 219. In short,
through negotiations and its position before us, it has taken
itself out of the PEB 219 mold, at least as to wages. Hence, the
possibility of a "destabilizing" effect between those bound by the
PEB 219 recommendations and others gaining a better wage benefit is
not present. This is not to say that the PEB 219 recommendations
may not be relevant. Rather, they will be considered, where
appropriate, on the same footing as other probative material.
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VI. ISSUES, POSITIONS OF THE
PARTIES, RECOMMENDATIONS
A. APPLICABLE TO ATDA, BLE, BMWE, IAM, IBEW, JCC
1.

WAGES

Amtrak Wage Proposal
Amtrak has proposed either adherence to the PEB 219 recommendations, or in consideration of their requested work rule relief,
the following schedule of general wage increases to the labor
organizations involved in the cases before PEB 222.
$2,000 lump sum

-

Immediate

5 percent

-

Upon ratification

4 percent

-

October 1, 1992

2 percent

-

January 1, 1993

3 percent

-

October 1, 1993

4 percent

-

October 1, 1994

2 percent

-

July 1, 1995

Amtrak also proposes a cost-of-living adjustment for each sixmonth period, beginning July 1, 1995, based upon the COLA formula
previously utilized by the parties.

JCC Wage Proposal
The JCC proposes the following schedule of general wage
increases:
4
5
5
5
3
2

percent
percent
percent
percent
percent
percent
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July 1, 1988
July 1, 1989
July 1, 1990
July 1, 1991
January 1, 1992
July 1, 1992

3 percent
2 percent
3 percent

-

January 1, 1993
July l, 1993
January 1, 1994

The JCC also proposes the abolition of all entry level rates.
In addition, it requests that all positions designated as Coach
Cleaner/Equipment Servicers receive a further $.30 per hour
increase, and that wage differentials for the second and third
tricks be paid in the amounts of $.25 and $.30 per hour, respectively.
ATDA Wage Proposal
The ATDA proposes the following
increases and lump sun payments:

schedule

of

base rate

Base Rate Increases
4 percent
-

May 1, 1991

3 percent
2 percent

-

July 1, 1991
October 1, 1991

4 percent

-

October 1, 1992

2 percent
3 percent
4 percent
Parity with Conrail: 1.8
percent for train dispatchers
and power directors; .6

percent for assistant chief
dispatchers

January 1, 1993
October 1, 1993
October 1, 1994

January 1, 1995

Lump Sum Payments
$2,000
$1,401

-

Signing date
July 1, 1992

$1,401
$1,443

-

January 1, 1993
January 1, 1994

$1,000

-

January 1, 1995

IBEW Wage Proposal
(On February 11, 1992, Amtrak and the IBEW reached an interim
agreement covering, among other things, the IBEW wage demands for
the period, July 1, 1988, through March 1, 1992.)
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The IBEW proposes the following schedule of
increases:
4 percent
October
3 percent
January
4 percent
October
4 percent
October

general wage
1,
1,
1,
l,

1992
1993
1993
1994

In addition, the IBEW seeks a "skill adjustment" of four
percent, to become effective with the consummation of an agreement
with Amtrak.
IAM Wage Proposal
The IAM proposes
increases:
5 percent
5 percent
3 percent
3 percent
3 percent
3 percent

the

following schedule of general wage
July 1, 1988
July 1, 1991
January 1, 1992
July 1, 1993
March 1, 1994
January 1, 1995

In addition, the IAM asks that all rates of pay be adjusted
every six months, commencing July 1, 1992, by application of an
automatic cost-of-living escalator clause based on a formula
providing a one-cent increase for each .3 percent rise in the CPI-W
(1967=100). Also, the IAM proposes a $.25 per hour shift differential for employees required to work a second shift and a $.35 per
hour shift differential for those required to work a third shift.
BMWE Wage Proposal
The BMWE proposes
increases:

the following schedule of general wage

4 percent
4 percent
4
5
5
5
5

July
July
July
July
July
July
July

percent
percent
percent
percent
percent
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1, 1988
1, 1989
1, 1990
1, 1991
1, 1992
1, 1993
1, 1994

The BMWE also proposes the elimination of reduced entry rates,
and equalization of rates of pay of the same classifications
between the southern and northern districts. In addition, the BMWE
asks that all rates of pay be adjusted every six months, commencing
July 1, 1992, by application of an automatic cost-of-living
escalator clause based on a formula providing a one-cent increase
for each .3 percent rise in the CPI-W.
BLE Wage Proposal
As nearly as the Board can determine, the BLE is asking, at a
minimum, for general increases of 4.5 percent in 1988; 4.4 percent
in 1989; 4.1 percent in 1990; 3.6 percent in 1991; and thereafter,
5 percent annually for the duration of its contract with Amtrak.
It also wants cost-of-living allowances equivalent to the postmoratorium COLA recommended by PEB 219. Finally, the BLE demands
full retroactivity, i.e., "[E]ach engineer who worked during the
pendency of this dispute will receive the applicable percentage
increases for the period he or she worked, without exception."
Position
Amtrak points out that its proposals are consistent with the
pattern established in agreements already reached with other
organizations on Amtrak that provided greater wage settlements for
additional rules relief. Such pattern agreements have been reached
with the following organizations:
The Amtrak Service Workers
Council (ASWC) , the Transportation Communications Union (TCU) , the
American Railway and Airway Supervisors (ARASA-M/E, ARASA-M/W, and
ARASA-OBS) , the Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen (BRS) , the Sheet
Metal Workers' International Association (SMWIA) , and the International Brotherhood of Boilermakers and Blacksmiths (IBB) . Two of
the organizations comprising elements of the ASWC — the Transport
Workers Union (TWU) and the TCU — have accepted the pattern
settlement. Those two unions also are part of the Joint Council of
Carmen and Coach Cleaners (JCC) , which, however, has not accepted
the pattern settlement.
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Amtrak advises that it has now negotiated agreements covering
more than 60 percent of its workforce. More than 50 percent of
those employees are covered by the Amtrak pattern. Agreements
reached with the ARASA (ME), the SMWIA, the IBB, and the International Brotherhood of Firemen and Oilers (IBF&O) cover approximately 26 percent of Amtrak's shopcraft employees.
Amtrak argues that its wage proposal is clearly more
beneficial to its employees than that proposed by PEB 219. It also
claims that the proposed increases are competitive when compared to
labor market increases and considering Amtrak's special financial
situation and ability to pay. Amtrak insists, moreover, that its
proposed wage package is fair. It provides a shopcraft journeyman
with an increase of $2.79 per hour (from $12.81 to $15.60) over the
life of the agreement, for a total of 21.7 percent.
According to Amtrak, its financial position, despite substantial improvement in the 1980s, is still shaky. The carrier states
that it is experiencing a short-term crisis: revenue and cash
reserves are very low, and a budget deficit of $67 million is
projected for FY 1992, even after receiving a federal operating
subsidy in excess of $330 million. Indeed, it points out, the
results for FY 1992 are hardly encouraging: ridership is down 5.6
percent; revenue is down .9 percent; expenses are up 1.8 percent.
Summing up, Amtrak declares that in order to survive it must
hold down its costs and increase its capital investments, so that
it can expand by extending its routes to areas needing more rail
passenger service.
It contends that its pattern proposal is
consistent with those objectives and fair to its employees.
Organizations Positions
Each of the organizations whose wage proposals are summarized
above presented extensive and detailed statements of its position
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on the wage issues. A common theme, however, ran through all the
presentations. It can be summarized as follows:
Amtrak workers in general have suffered a serious diminution
of real pay over the course of the past decade, as well as a
substantial further decline during the pendency of contract
negotiations leading up to the proceeding before this Board.
The wage progress of Amtrak workers has been substandard when
measured against that of almost all relevant comparators.
Amtrak wage levels for all classifications are below those
paid to comparable workers in other industries throughout the U.S.
Even under the organizations' proposals, a full recapturing of
lost wage progress will not be accomplished.
Recommendation
As we noted in the Introduction to this Report, through its
negotiations with other rail labor organizations and in its
position before us, Amtrak has removed itself from the so-called
pattern resulting from the PEB 219 wage recommendations and the
resultant federal law. It has, in fact, established a wage pattern
of its own, now covering about 50 percent of its employees. To
ignore that pattern and to grant each of the organizations here
involved its own wage demand would reduce Amtrak's wage structure
to chaos. We decline to make such a recommendation.
As the members of this Board stated in our Report in PEB 221,
"We consider it critical to the public interest that labor
relations and collective bargaining on the nation's railroads be
fair, stable, and reasonably consistent. Conversely, we believe
that political competition between and among unions for supremacy
of benefits, with its inevitably destabilizing consequences, is
damaging to the public interest." That observation seems to us to
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be equally applicable to the instant case.
Despite the appeal of some of the claims advanced by the
organizations in this case in support of their wage proposals and
their request for skill differentials, we believe that Amtrak's
wage proposal should be adopted. Because the JCC did not persuade
us of the merit of its proposal to abolish entry rates, we
recommend that it be withdrawn.
The proposals of the JCC and the IAM for increased shift
differentials should be withdrawn.
2.

TOTAL QUALITY COMMITMENT

Amtrak Position
Amtrak proposes that the Board recommend adoption of its
contract language on total quality commitment. It states that a
joint approach involving employees and supervisors at the local
level is essential to delivering total quality.
It requests
language stating that local supervisors and employees are encouraged to implement cooperative approaches, including quality
circles, to improve quality.
Organizations Positions
Some of the organizations have expressed opposition to this
proposal; others have not.
Recommendat ion
The achievement of quality performance and service is
essential to the success of Amtrak and to the job security of its
employees.
The parties recognize this and appreciate that its
attainment is based upon mutual cooperation, respect, and dedication. Although we do not think that this goal need be incorporated
in their collective bargaining agreement, we encourage them to give
joint attention to it and to consider undertaking mutually agreed-16-

upon arrangements to achieve that objective.
B. APPLICABLE TO IAM, IBEW, JCC
1.

COMPOSITE MECHANIC AND MECHANIC A & B
AND INCIDENTAL WORK RULE

Amtrak Position
Amtrak's proposal for a composite mechanic and Mechanic A & B
classifications are related, and will be considered together.
Under the title "employee utilization," Amtrak seeks more work
assignment flexibility in the assignment of both shopcraft and
operating employees than would be available under the incidental
work rule of the National Agreement. Its proposal, applicable to
the JCC, the IBEW, and the IAM, is that "employees perform work
they are capable of performing (after appropriate training)
including work not traditionally associated with their craft."
Additionally, Amtrak seeks to establish Mechanic A & B
classifications applicable to the JCC, the IBEW, and the IAM.
Amtrak claims that it needs further efficiencies in its shops.
In the maintenance area, the carrier asserts, it is common for
employees to possess mechanical aptitude and skills extending
beyond artificial work-assignment barriers created by existing
labor agreements.
Performing assignments based on skills and
abilities rather than classification, Amtrak insists, is an
absolute necessity if it is to move forward.
Amtrak claims that present classification of work rules are
complicated, location-specific arrangements of work jurisdiction.
They divide work among crafts in a manner that bears no relation to
the skills and abilities of the employee involved. It argues that
employees from three or four crafts should not be reguired to work
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on a project when the tasks involved are within the skills of one
or, at most, two. Amtrak seeks increased productivity as the
indispensable counterpart to the wage rate increase in the Amtrak
wage and work rule pattern.
Amtrak points out that this flexibility has been agreed to by
the SMWIA, the ARASA, the IBB&B, and the IBF4O, and that its
proposal provides that no existing employee will be furloughed as
a result of the rule relief.
Amtrak proposes the restructuring of its shopcraft employee
classifications into two skill levels of work, Mechanic A and
Mechanic B, with incumbent journeymen classed as A at the present
journeyman rate. Only new hires and incumbent Helpers will be
classified as B at a rate 85 percent of the Mechanic A rate.
Future hires will be subject to the new classifications and rate
structure, including entry rate schedules.
According to Amtrak, its proposal would allow for better
utilization of skilled manpower by assigning the preponderance of
work not of a journeyman level, to Mechanics B, and the skilled
journeyman work to Mechanics A.
Organizations Positions
Each of the affected organizations strongly opposes the
composite mechanic and Mechanic A and B proposals. Their collective position may be summarized as follows:
The purpose in establishing the composite mechanic classification is to obliterate all craft lines on Amtrak. The proposal
constitutes an unwarranted modification of the current system, is
directly contrary to historical practice, and conflicts with the
Railway Labor Act and the NMB's craft and class rulings, which have
been consistently construed to provide that employees be represent
-18-

ed in system-wide crafts or classes. Moreover, the proposal has
been rejected by emergency boards since 1966.
The IAM, the IBEW, and the JCC claim that the incidental work
rule, as extended by PEB 219, is all that Amtrak needs, and should
be fully implemented for a period of time before a "radical"
proposal such as the composite mechanic classification is considered.
The significance of settlements with SMWIA, IBF&O, and IBB&B
in which composite mechanic provisions were accepted, is
discounted. Together, the three organizations constitute only 19
percent of the shopcraft employees. According to the shopcrafts
involved in this case, the three smaller organizations agreed to
the proposal for self-preservation in the face of diminishing work
within their crafts.
The IAM, the IBEW, and the JCC opposition to Mechanic A and
Mechanic B classifications follows the same lines as their
opposition to composite mechanic or employee utilization.
The IAM interprets the proposal to mean that one-half the
workforce represented by the IAM would be at the lesser B rate,
resulting in a significant lowering of IAM wage rates by reclassification of the majority of the craft as lower-skilled. Newly
hired IAM mechanics, it charges, would work side by side with more
senior employees doing the same work at lower wage rates. The IAM
attacks the proposal as a two-tiered system that will inevitably
result in lowered morale and productivity.
The IBEW interprets the proposal as Amtrak's attempt to
establish a second-class group of craft workers that would be paid
substandard wages. The IBEW argues that a craft work environment
is entirely different from that of a production or manufacturing
environment, and that while efficiency may be obtained by fragment-19-

ing the latter, the opposite result occurs when the work of a
craftsman is fragmented.
The IBEW concludes that the Amtrak
proposal amounts to nothing more than a wage concession disguised
as a classification scheme.
The JCC views the Mechanic A & B proposal as "another look at
the composite mechanic." At 85 percent of the journeyman rate, it
points out, the Mechanic B wage rate is 30 cents an hour less than
helpers currently earn.
The craft is basically comprised of
journeymen, with only 3 percent as helpers. According to the JCC,
the Mechanic A & B proposal would result in one-half the workforce
being classified at the B rate, and over time, substantially more
in that category.
Recommendation
We find no pattern as a result of agreements on "work
flexibility" or "employee utilization" programs with a few of the
smaller crafts; they represent a very small part of the workforce,
and it appears that implementation of their arrangements will
depend on similar arrangements with the major craft organizations.
What we do find, however, is that the proposal for a composite
mechanic (or "employee utilization") and for the creation of
Mechanic A & B classifications are premature. PEB 219, rejected a
composite mechanic classification, but it did reiterate and expand
the incidental work rule. PEB 219 said inter alia;
"...we are persuaded that the time has come to
eliminate some of the restrictions which
unnecessarily add time, costs, and delays to
the accomplishment of shopcraft work.
Too
that end the Board recommends that: (1) The
coverage of the rule be expanded to include
all shop craft employees and the back shop.
(2) "Incidental Work" be redefined to include
simple tasks that require neither special
training nor special tools. (3) The Carriers
be allowed to assign such simple tasks to any
craft employee capable of performing them for
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a maximum of two hours per work day, such
hours not to be considered when determining
what constitutes a "preponderant part of the
assignment."
We believe that recommendation is sufficient. The incidental
work rule has not yet been fully implemented, and therefore has not
yet been tested. We agree with the organizations that experience
under that rule should be fully evaluated before the other Amtrak
proposals discussed above are considered on their merits.
2.

EXERCISE OF SENIORITY RIGHTS UNDER THE REDUCING &
INCREASING OF FORCES RULES

Amtrak Position
Amtrak seeks to amend the rules pertaining to reducing and
increasing forces, which govern how employees move from one
position to another in the event of job abolishment or displacement. Amtrak proposes the following modifications:
1.

Require employees whose positions are abolished to exercise their displacement rights
within 5 days of notice to be effective on the
date of abolishment.

2.

Require displaced employees to exercise displacement rights under two working days thereafter.

3.

Require displacement of junior employees when
an employee chooses to displace where positions are substantially the same or identical
with the same hours, rest days, and supervisor.

4.

When facility improvements require relocation
of forces/operations, arrange forces at a
facility without abolishing and readvertising
positions when the hours, work days, assigned
duties, conditions and/or rest days are unchanged .

5.

Assign employees who fail to exercise displacement rights within specified time frames
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to either displace the junior employee or be
assigned to any available position or work at
the location.
Amtrak presents a number of examples which it states demonstrate the need for reform in the exercise of seniority rights. It
contends that the proposed changes will stabilize the workforce and
cut down on the disruptive movement across jobs and work areas.
Organizations Positions
The IAM opposes Amtrak's proposal to reduce the advance notice
Amtrak is required to give regarding decreasing and increasing
force rules. It states that employees need as much advance notice
of changes as possible.
The IAM also opposes the proposed change that would require
displaced employees to exercise displacement rights within two days
after the displacement. It states that there are so many factors
that an employee needs to consider in large facilities like Beech
Grove or Wilmington that the time should not be reduced from seven
days to two. The IAM opposes, as well, Amtrak's proposal that an
employee who chooses to displace, when positions are substantially
the same or identical with the same hours and rest days and
supervisor, must displace the junior employee. The IAM states that
the proposal deprives the senior employee of significant job
possibilities.
Finally, the IAM opposes Amtrak's proposal that when the
relocation of forces or operations within the facility occurs due
to facility improvements, the forces or operations can be moved
without readvertising the involved positions. The organization
sees no reason to modify the existing rule, pointing out that it
has always tried to cooperate with Amtrak any time there is a
demonstrated needed to move people.
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The JCC objects to Amtrak's proposals.
Amtrak notes the IBEW's opposition to its proposals

The Board recommends that Amtrak's proposals be adopted by the
IAM, the IBEW and the JCC. We believe that these concessions are
needed to allow the carrier more quickly to stabilize its forces in
the event of job abolishments or displacements, and will lead to
significant productivity gains as a result.
3.

PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS

Amtrak Position
Amtrak proposes to extend to all shopcraft employees the
medical examination schedule followed by the majority of its
employees. It seeks a rule that allows the carrier the option of
requiring employees who do not perform service for the company for
30 calendar days to submit to a complete medical examination to
determine their fitness for service. Amtrak states that an absence
of 30 days may suggest that a serious event or change has occurred,
and that Amtrak is obligated to ensure that its employees are in
good physical and mental condition, and capable of performing
duties without harm to themselves or others.
Amtrak seeks
consistent contract language on this subject with all of its
unions.
Organizations Positions
The IAM does not accept Amtrak's proposal relating to a
required medical examination for employees who are off for more
than 30 days. It states that employees may be off for numerous
reasons that do not involve ill health.
It also asserts that
Amtrak has leeway under the existing agreement, Article 23, to
determine an employee's physical fitness for service at any time it
deems appropriate. Moreover, it points out, certain machinists in
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safety-sensitive positions or subject to the Hours of Service Act
are subject to random drug testing under FRA regulations.
The JCC objects to Amtrak's proposals.
Amtrak notes the IBEW's opposition to its proposal.
Recommendation
We are persuaded that Amtrak's proposal is reasonable. There
is sufficient justification for the proposal in Amtrak's duty to
the public and its own employees to make certain that Amtrak
employees are medically fit, so that Amtrak service is performed in
a safe manner.
The Board recommends that Amtrak's proposal be
adopted by the IAM, the IBEW, and the JCC.
C.
1.

APPLICABLE TO BMWE, IAM, JCC
HEALTH AND WELFARE, CONTRIBUTIONS AND SUPPLEMENTAL SICKNESS

Organizations Position
The organizations seek a separate plan for Amtrak employees
they represent and their dependents.

Amtrak Position
Amtrak argues that the recommendation of PEB 219, as clarified
by the Special Board, and as applicable to all the other
organizations with which it has contracts, should be made
applicable to these organizations. Included, Amtrak asserts, are
the numerous detailed changes in the plan that are identical as to
each organization. The changes include provisions for employee
cost-sharing commencing in 1993.
Recommendation
This is an issue that should be resolved on the basis of the
recommendation of PEB 219, as clarified by the Special Board, with
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the changes applicable to the other organizations. To do otherwise
would create different health and welfare plans among employees of
Amtrak.
The disaf filiation of the employees of the three
organizations could detract from the fiscal vitality of the
National Plan, with the attendant risk that benefits, experienceratings, and costs may differ.
We think this would be
destabilizing both to the relationships among the employees and
their representative organizations and to labor relations between
Amtrak and those organizations.
The organizations' proposals should be withdrawn, and the
Amtrak proposal, based on the PEB 219 recommendation, including
the sharing of cost increases, should be adopted.
D. APPLICABLE TO IAM and IBEW
1.

MONTHLY RATED POSITIONS

Amtrak Position
Amtrak seeks the elimination of monthly rates and the
conversion of monthly rated positions to hourly rated positions
when they become vacant due to attrition. The jobs affected are
roadway mechanic on the Boston Division and shop extension
electrician on the West Coast Division, represented respectively
by the IAM and the IBEW. These positions pay a monthly rate based
on a scheduled 40-hour workweek with an additional eight hours'
straight time for Saturday, whether worked or not. Hourly overtime
pay does not begin until after the 50th hour worked in the week.
Amtrak's case centers on the roadway mechanic in the Boston
Division. It states that there are few instances of such employees
working more than 40 hours per week, and those instances are
limited to individuals whose duties include securing high-speed
surfacing and ballast cleaning equipment. Amtrak claims these
employees averaged 41.7 hours of work, Monday through Friday, and
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were paid a guaranteed eight hours for Saturday. Amtrak concludes
that it is paying excess money.
Organizations Positions
Neither the IAM nor the IBEW responded to this proposal.
Recommendation
We see no reason to continue for new hires an arrangement
that requires Amtrak to pay for time not worked. The IAM and the
IBEW have not explained the reasons for this guarantee, nor has the
IAM rebutted Amtrak's statistics showing that only a few roadway
mechanics work on Saturday, with most gaining the extra eight
hours' pay without working. On the other hand, Amtrak has provided
no information on Saturday work or nonwork by the shop extension
electrician in the West Coast Division. It is our recommendation
therefore, that the monthly rate shall continue for incumbent
roadway mechanics, but that for new hires the pay may be changed
from a monthly rate to an hourly rate, with overtime in accordance
with the contract for hourly-paid employees. The same shall apply
to shop extension electricians only if the facts as to them are the
same as with the roadway mechanics.
E. APPLICABLE TO ATDA
1.

COMBINING TERRITORIES AND JOBS

Amtrak Position
Amtrak seeks to relax present restrictions on blanking or
combining positions. It wants the same right to determine manning
as it has with other nonoperating groups with seven-day
assignments, so that it will no longer need to use two employees
when only one is required, or obtain the organization's approval
for these changes. Amtrak seeks a recommendation that would enable
it to combine positions on those shifts or days when there is a
decreased workload.
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ATDA Position
The American Train Dispatchers Association (ATDA) sees no need
to change the present requirement that its General Chairman,
together with the carrier, must agree to permit blanking and
combining. The organization claims that Amtrak has not shown any
need for a change, and that if Amtrak's proposal is accepted, the
ATDA will have no effective remedy if its contrary position in a
particular case is upheld. In respect of the latter point, the
organization contends that appeals to the Railroad-Train
Dispatchers Joint Committee take a minimum of 90 days to decision,
during which the combining or blanking would have long since been
implemented. Moreover, it claims that Amtrak now states that the
decisions of the Committee are not final and binding.
The ATDA cites several examples of Amtrak's present ability
unilaterally to change the number of positions on a shift or add
or abolish jobs as traffic volume changes. The organization claims
that it has been cooperative in agreeing to the combining of
territories, and points out that only once in 16 years has an
Amtrak proposal for combining been rejected.
The ATDA also notes that PEB 219 rejected a similar proposal
by the carriers. It claims that there are distinct differences
between combining in repair facilities or clerical offices and the
combining of dispatching functions.
The latter involves
substantial safety issues justifying organization consent for
combining, particularly because dispatcher manning is at minimum
levels.
The ATDA discounts its agreement on this proposal with
Conrail. It would not have made such an agreement, it explains, had
it known that Conrail, too, now deems the decisions of the
Committee to be nonbinding and has refused to comply with them. In
sum, the organization insists on a continued voice in the matter in
light of its safety liability and potential stress factors. It
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recognizes legitimate needs for reducing force (as on weekends) and
has agreed to such reductions. According to the ATDA, the issue
should be negotiated on a case-by-case basis.
Recommendation
Amtrak does not say that the ATDA has not been cooperative in
circumstances in which reductions in traffic justify either the
combining of jobs or the extension of territories.
The
organization has cited several instances when its General Chairman
agreed to combine jobs and to change territorial restrictions.
Conversely, Amtrak has not given specific examples of situations,
which it believed warranted job combinations or territory changes,
when the General Chairman has refused to agree to such changes.
That being so, we see no pressing justification for Amtrak's
proposal that it have the right to act unilaterally, when so far
such requirements have been met by mutual agreement.
We recommend that Amtrak withdraw its proposal on combining
jobs and territory changes.
However, as it is a traditional
managerial right to determine which jobs are actively worked, we
see no reason why Amtrak cannot unilaterally decide on job
blanking.
We recommend that its right to do so be recognized,
provided that another employee does not perform the duties of the
blanked job.
2.

QUALIFYING PAY

Amtrak Position
At present, dispatchers are paid while obtaining "territorial
qualifications". Amtrak claims that guaranteed payment for all
time spent qualifying leads to abuses. It alleges that employees
bid to different assignments, thereby pyramiding qualifying pay and
causing unnecessary expenses and an unstable workforce.
Amtrak
wishes to put a stop to what it characterizes as "professional
qualifiers."
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ATDA Position
The ATDA denies that its members manipulate bids to pyramid
qualifying pay or otherwise abuse the process. It points out that
the procedure is rigid, coming into play only when a vacancy
occurs, and may be used only when the bidding employee has been
displaced. It notes that whatever the carrier spends on qualifying
time and pay is off-set by later uses of the newly qualified
employee, such as on assignments to maintain any desk in an office
or to fill vacancies created by leaves and sickness, without
additional compensation. The ATDA also argues that if employees
must qualify on their own time, they will hurry their qualifying
with an eye toward the cost they personally incur or take the
chance of working a job even if unqualified, with unsafe
consequences. Use of rest time for qualifying, it points out, has
obvious inimical effects on safety.
Finally, the organization
argues that it would distort the seniority system to permit junior
employees to qualify while senior employees are unable to take time
off to do so.
Recommendation
Amtrak alleges abuses, but has not particularized them.
Qualifying on territories is a contractual part of a dispatcher's
job security, when he or she is displaced. We fail to see under
that circumstance why the dispatcher should be required to become
familiar with a new territory and its job duties on his or her own
time and without compensation. As the dispatcher has the right to
qualify only when displaced, and is required to remain in the job
after qualifying until again displaced, we do not see how alleged
abuses by so-called "professional qualifiers" can be either
widespread or represent a problem for Amtrak that it cannot
control.
Accordingly, it is our recommendation that there be no change
in the present qualifying rule.
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3.

POSTING ALLOWANCE/CALL ALLOWANCE

Amtrak Position
Amtrak claims that there is no justification for continuing
the $10.00 a day payment when a new employee is assigned to work
with a more experienced employee. It argues and proposes that
seasoned employees should be reasonably required to provide some
on-the-job instruction without additional payment.
Amtrak also proposes eliminating the two-hour penalty payment
when a management official calls a dispatcher at home for
information regarding movement that the dispatcher was involved
with during his or her tour of duty.
ATDA Position
The ATDA contends that the $10.00 a day posting allowance is
appropriate and moderate compensation for the extra duties and
potential liability attendant to training new employees.
As to the call allowance, the organization points out that
Amtrak is not required to pay $2.00 for calls to an off-duty
employee except when such a call is of a nonemergency nature. In
the ATDA's view, such a charge is an appropriate deterrent to an
unnecessary intrusion on an employee's time off.
Recommendation
In our opinion, the $10.00 a day posting allowance is
reasonably related to and justified by the additional instructional
duties assumed by the experienced employee. The $2.00 call pay can
be controlled by Amtrak, which is required to pay it only for
nonemergency calls.
We recommend that Amtrak withdraw its
proposals.
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4.

SICK LEAVE

Amtrak Position
Amtrak claims that present sick leave benefits for ATDArepresented employees are well in excess of agreements with other
Amtrak crafts. It points out that a dispatcher can receive sick
benefits for up to 240 days in a calendar year, leading to
excessive costs and encouraging abuses.
Amtrak proposes
alternatives. One is to reduce costs by not paying for the first
day of illness and by paying reduced percentage amounts on the days
for which benefits are paid. For new hires, benefits would be at
parity with other Amtrak agreements. Another is a proposal that
existing employees get benefits that are the same as what new
employees would receive, but with an "up-front *bank' of days
credited."
ATDA Position
The ATDA responds to Amtrak's reduced sick leave proposal with
a counter proposal, namely, to reduce daily full pay benefits for
all employees to 90 percent; deny pre-1982 hires sick pay in the
first day of sickness annually after 10 sick days are used; and,
for new employees, off-set all sick pay by RUIA benefits, with a
scale of sick days dependent on years of service. It also proposes
that dispatchers be eligible for an additional supplement of 70
percent pay, less RUIA, excluding the first four days of each
succeeding sickness absence, under a defined schedule. The ATDA
views this as a significant concession,
which reasonably
accommodates Amtrak's concerns while maintaining an acceptable
level of benefits.

Recommendation
There is inadequate evidence in the record to support a
recommendation in favor of the diminution of sick leave benefits as
proposed by Amtrak. More important, changes proposed by Amtrak
might have a destabilizing effect, as other employees would be
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working under different sick leave benefits. On the other hand,
the ATDA has made a counter proposal which, if implemented, would
appear to provide some savings to Amtrak, albeit not as much as if
Amtrak's proposals were accepted. We think that the ATDA counter
proposal should be implemented as a means of generating savings in
the form of a voluntary give-back.
E. APPLICABLE TO BLE
1.

REDESIGNATION OF FIREMEN, FIREMEN MANNING, RATES & ROSTERS

Amtrak Position
Amtrak proposes that employees classified as passenger firemen
be redesignated as assistant engineers.
Under its current
agreement, Amtrak employs passenger firemen on its off-corridor
trains when the scheduled running time of the assignment exceeds
four hours. These assignments are called "must-fill assignments."
In addition, certain assignments in off-corridor service are
identified as "blankable fireman assignments" and may be filled by
a passenger fireman under certain limited circumstances. Amtrak
has offered to increase the passenger fireman rate, in increments,
by $2.28 an hour over the life of the contract, over and above the
contractual raises. Amtrak proposes that the must-fill requirement
be increased to five hours running time, and blankable positions be
eliminated, and that one extra board be established at each offcorridor crew base, which would be guaranteed 40-hours1 pay at this
newly-created rate.
Amtrak states that its blankable firemen positions are down
from 23 to two. And, if under the new language an assistant
passenger engineer would not have a place to go, he or she would
have to take an engineer's position in the work zone. If none is
available, these individuals would have an opportunity to occupy
the two blankable positions.
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R

The BLE objects to increasing the running time from four hours
to five hours before the must-fill requirement applies. The BLE
states that any proposal to combine the engineer and fireman
rosters must have protection built into it to protect prior rights
of firemen in their crew bases.
The BLE also objects to the carrier's request for the
establishment of common extra boards. It states that the original
off-corridor agreement called for the establishment of application
pools for future engine service positions. It states that a
proposal to merge extra boards is premature while the pools exist,
because these individuals have a contractual right to new engineer
positions.
Recommendation
The Board recommends that the title of passenger fireman
should be redesignated assistant passenger engineer. This title
reflects the fact that such employees must be qualified locomotive
engineers, and are expected to share the duties of operating a
train with a passenger engineer. Also, the name would be the same
as used in the auto train service.
The Board recommends that Amtrak 's proposal to increase the
running time before the must-fill requirement applies from four to
five hours be withdrawn.
Amtrak has not presented persuasive
evidence that it is safe for one individual to operate a passenger
train for five straight hours.
The Board recommends that Amtrak's proposal to increase the
off-corridor rate for the newly designated assistant passenger
engineer position by $2.28 per hour in the phases proposed by
Amtrak be adopted.
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The Board recommends that Amtrak eliminate the two remaining
blankable positions, subject to the limited rights of the former
firemen who could have occupied such blankable positions again to
fill these positions, if they cannot occupy any engineer or
assistant engineer position in their respective work zones. The
BLE has not demonstrated to this Board that Amtrak has a continuing
contractuall obligation to fill new engineer positions with
individuals in "application pools" established under the original
off-corridor agreement, as opposed to the present passenger firemen
(qualified locomotive engineers) employed on Amtrak's off-corridor
trains.
The Board recommends that the parties negotiate an agreement
combining the engineers and firemen rosters. The new roster must
have protection built into it to protect prior rights of former
firemen in their crew bases. Once the questions on the combining
of the rosters are resolved, the Board recommends that the parties
negotiate an agreement on both the establishment of one extra board
at a location to fill both passenger engineer and assistant
passenger engineer vacancies and the manner in which each vacancy
is to be filled. The extra boards shall be guaranteed 40 hours per
week. Employees on the extra board shall be paid at the rate
applicable to the position occupied and for the entire weekly
period (if the employee is available); and the employee shall be
guaranteed the money equivalent of 40 straight-time hours at the
assistant passenger engineer rate of pay.
However should
individuals listed on the present passengerr engineer seniority
roster as of May 28, 1992, be on the new extra board, their
guaranteed rate shall be at the engineer rate of pay.
2.

APPLY THE "8 WITHIN 9" TO THE NORTHEAST CORRIDOR

Amtrak Position
Amtrak proposes to make the method of pay in the Northeast
Corridor the same as is applicable now to the majority of engineers
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in off -corridor service, under the "8 within 9" rule.

Passenger

engineer assignments in the Northeast Corridor run on a turnaround
basis, with a passenger engineer having anywhere from a one to four
hour paid release period at the turning point of the assignment.
This proposal would give Amtrak credit for one of those paid hours
if the assignment operates in excess of eight hours.
Position
The BLE states that Amtrak alone has control over the working
hours of engineers in the corridor. It points out that scheduling
is done only by Amtrak. It states that Amtrak is seeking to cut
the pay of crews in the corridor.
Recommendation
The agreement covering passenger engineers in the Northeast
Corridor setting forth the method of paying for passenger engineers
is presumptive evidence that both sides recognized that passenger
engineers are subject to Amtrak 's direction during the release
period.
Moreover, it is not controverted that Amtrak alone
controls the scheduling of the engineers on the corridor.
The
carrier has not demonstrated to this Board that an underlying
change in the basis for the agreement has occurred to justify the
one-hour reduction in pay that
would apply to the affected
engineer.
We therefore recommend that Amtrak 's proposal be
withdrawn .
3. REDUCTION OF YARD SERVICE RATE FOR NEW HIRES

Amtrak Position
Amtrak proposes to reduce by 10 percent the hourly rate of pay
for yard service engineers hired after the date of the agreement.
Existing employees would be grandfathered.
Amtrak pays its
engineers assigned to yard service the same hourly rate as that of
engineers who operate over-the-road. This rate is considerably
higher than the national rate for freight yard service.
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RTiF!

position

The BLE responds that it was Amtrak that wanted an across-theboard single hourly rate of pay. Now, the BLE states, the carrier
wishes to undo the deal by creating a permanent two-tier wage
system on the property.
Recommendation
We recommend that new yard service engineers shall serve at 90
percent of the hourly rate just for the first two years of their
service.
4.

AUTO TRAIN:

EXTRA BOARDS

Position

Fifteen passenger engineers and assistant passenger engineers
are covered under a separate collective bargaining agreement for
auto train service. The territory covered by the auto train is
basically the same as the territory encompassed in off-corridor
work zones 5 and 6. Amtrak 's proposal is to use one extra board in
zone 5, with the Board to be located in Washington D.C., to protect
both the auto train and off -corridor vacancies. It also wants the
option to eliminate the auto train extra board at Sanford, Florida,
in zone 6, at a future time. Amtrak states that its proposal will
increase administrative efficiency and eliminate the waste of
manpower resources resulting from duplicate extra boards covering
the same territory.
BT.y; Position
The BLE states that Amtrak has not demonstrated an operational
need for the change. The BLE further states that Amtrak does not
want to change anything in the separate collective bargaining
agreements, except those few things that would benefit the carrier.
Auto train engineers must spend four more hours away from home than
other Amtrak engineers before earning held-away-from-home payments.
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Yet, according to the BLE, Amtrak does not want to correct that
inequity.
Recommendation
Amtrak has effectively made out a case that increased
administrative efficiency and elimination of the waste of manpower
resources will be achieved by its proposal for zone 5.
We
therefore recommend that the auto train extra board at Lorton,
Virginia, be eliminated and the existing work zone 5 extra board
located in Washington, D.C., be used to cover auto train vacancies.
Amtrak must allocate a percentage of extra board positions to auto
train employees and must guarantee that no existing auto train or
work zone 5 employee will be furloughed as a direct result of this
combination of extra boards. An employee called off the extra
board would be paid at the rate of the position worked and under
the terms of the agreement covering the service. Because Sanford,
Florida, is not within the effective reach of the Jacksonville
extra board, we recommend that Amtrak's proposal for zone 6 be
withdrawn.
5.

CERTIFICATION ALLOWANCE

BLE Position

The BLE proposes that each engineer should receive a monthly
allowance of $250 for each full month he or she maintains
certification. The BLE believes that this allowance is justified
by the high speed operation of Amtrak trains and the critical
position occupied in the safety chain by the engineer.
Amtrak Position
Amtrak opposes the BLE proposal on the ground that the parties
agreed to a pay structure based on a straight hourly rate of pay
and the elimination of arbitraries.
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Recpmmendation
The Board fully recognizes the high degree of competence
required
of
passenger
engineers
and
the
significant
responsibilities of their position. The factors cited by the BLE
as justification for the proposed certification payment are factors
which are properly considered when establishing the engineers'
hourly rate of pay.
The BLE has not presented additional
justification for a certification payment. The Board recommends
that the proposal be withdrawn.
6.

EXTRA BOARD MARK OFFS

RT.F Position
The BLE proposes that the guaranteed extra board rule be
amended to provide that an engineer who marks off will have his
guarantee reduced by the greater of a pro-rata share of the
guarantee or the earnings of the assignment the engineer would have
worked.
The BLE ties its discussion of this issue to its
discussion of its proposal on the need for sick pay and the
contention that sick engineers may be forced by economic
consideration to run passenger trains. It states that under the
present rule an engineer loses his or her entire weekly guarantee
if the engineer marks off for a single day because of illness.

Amtrak Position
Amtrak does not present a position on this proposal.
Recommendation
Amtrak provides the economic guarantee of 40 hours of pay per
week for those engineers who hold themselves available for service
on a 24-hour-a-day basis for their entire workweek. The guaranteed
payment is made as an incentive for engineers to maintain their
availability for their entire workweek, and when an individual
fails to be available, his or her entire guarantee is lost. We are
persuaded that an exception is warranted for engineers who cannot
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for a sixth day in a workweek consisting of three class days
followed by three workdays.
Amtrak Position
Amtrak does not present a position on this proposal.

Recommendation
On this issue the BLE makes a brief proposal and Amtrak
presents no response.
We are not satisfied that the record
justifies a determination on the merits of the BLE proposal. There
is simply not enough information before us to make an informed
decision. We recommend that the proposal be withdrawn.
9.
RT-E

PAY FOR QUALIFYING TIME

Position

The BLE proposes that engineers be paid for all qualifying
time, up to a maximum period for each territory based on a schedule
negotiated by the parties. Pay for qualifying time is essential to
promoting the highest performance levels for engineers, according
to the BLE. It argues that paid qualifying time would markedly
enhance safety by easing the financial burden on the engineer. The
organization further states that when it suits Amtrak's purposes,
Amtrak will pay for the engineer who must requalify, but it will
not pay for others, after their first qualification.

Amtrak Position
Amtrak does not present a position on this proposal.

Recommendat ion
The record establishes that on certain occasions engineers are
not paid for qualifying time. We are not persuaded that there is
sufficient evidence before the Board to justify a change in the
existing practice. The proposal should be withdrawn.
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10.

HOURS OF SERVICE ACT

^VE Position
The BLE seeks a rule that would make engineers whole when they
cannot work their assignment due to the Hours of Service Act. The
BLE explains that an engineer may be ordered to report late for his
or her regular assignment and, as a result, will not have a
sufficient rest period to work the next assignment. Consequently,
the engineer will lose the opportunity to earn pay for that
assignment.
Amtrak Position
Amtrak does not present a position on this proposal.

We are persuaded that engineers need relief for those
situations when, due to the Hours of Service Act, they cannot work
their regular assignment, through no fault of their own. The BLE
proposal will have no destabilizing effect on other operating craft
employees, because the UTU and Amtrak have negotiated a rule on
this matter. The Board recommends that the parties adopt a rule
that will allow the engineer so affected the earnings of his or her
missed assignment for the calendar day, with a maximum of eight
hours ' pay .
11.

SERVICE CREDITS AND RELIEF DAY

This Board has disposed of a number of the BLE issues dealing
specifically with firemen in its discussion of some Amtrak
proposals.
Some ambiguity may possibly exist on service credits
for firemen, and that matter is dealt with below.

RT.T
The BLE states that the current agreements between the BLE and
Amtrak contain a multitiered wage system that provides for a five
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year wage progression beginning at 75 percent of the full rate. An
increasing number of new hires in engine service bring with them
considerable prior experience. Amtrak credits this experience for
those new hires engaged as engineers, but it does not do so for
firemen. The BLE proposes that firemen also receive credit for
prior engine service experience.
Amtrak Position
Amtrak does not present a position on this proposal.
Recommendation
We believe that this issue is resolved by our recommendation
that firemen be redesignated as assistant engineers.
12.

CALLING RULES

RT^E position
The BLE proposes that the calling rules be amended to provide
engineers the option of obtaining two additional hours rest beyond
that required by the Hours of Service Act. The BLE also proposes
that engineers be given the right to request an eight hour call.
Amtrak Position
Amtrak opposes the BLE proposal.
It asserts that it has
worked out reverse lodging agreements with the BLE to accommodate
employees rest requirements in conjunction with the calling rules.
Recommendation
The Board recognizes that the requirements of service for
passenger engineers, including the calling rules, place very
significant demands upon them. However, this Board does not have
sufficient information before it to justify the changes that the
BLE seeks on Amtrak.
The BLE has not demonstrated that the
provisions it would like to modify are more onerous than those
which apply to other engineers or other operating craft employees
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throughout the country.
withdrawn.

The Board recommends that the proposals be

13.

MEAL ALLOWANCE

R'kg Position
The BLE proposes that the meal allowance paid employees held
away from home be raised from $4.15 to $10.00.
Amtrak Position
Amtrak does not present a position on this proposal.
Recommendation
The Board notes that $4.15 is not a sufficient allowance for
a meal. We recommend that the parties increase this allowance to
$5.00 upon the signing of a new agreement.
Also, effective
November 1, 1994, the parties should increase the allowance to
$6.00. Such allowance would be in parity with the operating crafts
represented by the UTU, who now have a meal allowance of $5.00,
which will be increased to $6.00 on November 1, 1994.
14.

AUTO TRAIN:

HELD-AWAY-FROM-HOME COMPENSATION

RT.fl Position
The BLE proposes extending to auto train service the present
held-away-from-home compensation rule. It asks the Board to correct
an anomalous situation that affects the small number of engineers
who work in auto train service. Auto train engineers presently may
be held away from home for up to 16 hours before they become
eligible for compensation. Other off-corridor engineers, including
some who work on other trains traveling the same route as the auto
train, become eligible for compensation at the expiration of 12
hours. The BLE states its belief that the auto train rule is an
anachronism that should be abolished, given the small number of
employees involved.
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Position
Amtrak does not present a position on this proposal.
Recommendation
The evidence presented by the BLE is insufficient to justify
changing the present agreement. We recommend that its proposal be
withdrawn.
G.

APPLICABLE TO BMWE
1.

ENTRY RATES

BMWE Position
The BMWE seeks the elimination of entry rates. It asserts
that the current five-year progression from 75 percent of the top
rate is not justified, that it establishes a two-tier compensation
system victimizing those who suffer the worst seasonality of
employment, and that it subsidizes Amtrak through inadequate wages.
Amtrak Position
Amtrak argues that the recommendations of PEB 219 on this
issue should be followed. PEB 219 recommended an exclusion from
this rule for foremen, mechanics, and production gang members
operating heavy, self-propelled equipment that requires skill and
experience.
Recommendation
BMWE employees in the highest-rated positions who work for
freight carriers other than Conrail have already been granted the
exclusion from wage progression sought by the organization in this
case. There is some merit, however, in applying lower entry rates
and wage progression to those working in lower-paying positions, in
as much as they are likely to be less productive until they master
the full range of their job duties. Nevertheless, we find a fiveyear progression based upon a 75 percent hiring rate to be
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inequitable in the light of the lesser-skilled nature of the work
involved and the greater burdens seasonality of employment imposes
upon them. Accordingly, we recommend that the exclusion from rate
progression accorded by PEB 219 be extended to BMWE employees of
Amtrak, and that those not covered by that exclusion be granted a
two-year rate progression commencing at 90 percent and advancing to
95 percent at the end of the first year and to full rate at the end
of the second year.
2.

PER DIEM

Amtrak Position
Amtrak proposes it have the option of providing per diem
payments of $29 for travelling gangs in place of the requirement of
maintaining camp cars. It asserts that the Northeast Corridor is
relatively compact compared to the size of other properties; that
there are abundant overnight accommodations and lodgings available
in the area; that many employees live nearby and commute; and that
its proposal will reduce the burdens of camp maintenance and
expenditure.
BMWE Position
The BMWE asserts that Amtrak's proposal is inadequate; that
employees who are required to live away from home are unable to do
so at the rates provided by the carrier; that the area does not
have abundant inexpensive facilities; and that the amount of per
diem should be increased.
Recommendation
Amtrak has the authority to determine whether to continue the
operation of camp cars or to provide a reasonable level of per diem
to cover the cost of lodging and meals to replace the facilities at
the camp cars. The organization's claim for additional per diem
has merit. The allowance should be raised to $35 to cover the
actual cost of food and lodging.
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3.

TRAVEL ALLOWANCE INCREASES

BMWE Position

The BMWE asserts that employees incur considerable personal
expense driving from their homes to temporary lodging locations and
returning home on rest days. It proposes that a greater portion of
the actual expense be compensated, and that employees be given
cost-of-living adjustments of this benefit for the life of the
contract.
Amtrak Position
Amtrak does not present a position on this proposal.

The BMWE has not presented sufficient information to support
its proposals. We recommend that it be withdrawn.
4.

RESTRICTED EXERCISE OF SENIORITY

A^trak Position
Amtrak proposes that BMWE employees be restricted from bidding
on lower-rated and lateral jobs and that employees holding
temporary jobs fill them when those jobs become a permanent
position. Amtrak also proposes tht when displacements occur, the
most junior employee be displaced.
Amtrak points out that when a senior employee exercises
seniority to bid to an equal or lower-rated position, the carrier
loses a certain level of experience, which when taken cumulatively,
reduces the productivity of its work force. It also claims that
even when an employee makes a voluntary lateral bid, the make-up
and stability of a gang is affected by the movement and results in
a loss of productivity.

-46-

Amtrak proposes that when a displacement is made within a
gang, the junior such employee in that classification be bumped.
It claims that at the present time employees engage in "chain
bumping" which disrupts the work force until the junior employee is
finally bumped.
Amtrak also proposes that furloughed employees be required to
list on their furlough papers the work zones to which they will
accept recall. An employee who then failed to respond to a recall
for such work zone or zones would forfeit seniority. The carrier
further proposes a rule which would prevent an employee recalled to
a new position being displaced by an active employee. Amtrak
points out that at the present time employees may leave their
existing jobs without notice to their supervisors and bump the
recalled employee.
According to Amtrak, it agreed with the BMWE that available
"qualified" employees must fill vacanciies. The problem involves
the definition of the term "qualified." Currently, any employee on
the seniority roster of the vacant position is deemed "qualified."
Amtrak urges that the definition needs to include those trained but
not on the roster. It argues that those who have been trained are
qualified, whether they are on the seniority roster or not.
BMWE Position
The BMWE takes the position that management has demanded many
far-reaching, fundamental changes in the right of the organization
to exercise and obtain seniority.
It urges that the change
proposed by Amtrak would eliminate the equity earned by each BMWE
member and replace it with a sophisticated version of the notorious
"shape-up" system which existed on the nation's waterfront. The
BMWE notes that the current rule permits employees to bid as many
times as they wish within a calendar year, with certain exceptions.
This includes bidding up at the earliest opportunity.
The
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organization argues that there certainly should be no requirement
to bid the higher-rated position at the first opportunity.
Recommendation
The Board finds that the proposals of Amtrak seeking to limit
the current right to bid or bump imposes restrictions on the
employees' right to move between positions. The Board recommends
that employees be permitted to make one lateral bid per calendar
year unless excepted from the limitation by the Assistant Chief
Engineer. Also, the employees may voluntarily displace once per
calendar year in a lower-rated position.
The foregoing
recommendations protect the employees' rights to some job movement
while at the same time satisfying some of the carriers' concerns
that employee movements might be excessive. The other proposal by
Amtrak on forfeiture of seniority in a higher classification while
working on a lower classification is not justified and should be
withdrawn.
5.

REGIONAL AND SYSTEM-WIDE GANGS

Amtrak Positon
Amtrak proposes that geographical restrictions on the use of
traveling gangs be eliminated throughout the Northeast.
Amtrak
explains that these traveling gangs are frequently high-production
units requiring experienced operators; therefore, the loss of
highly proficient employees when equipment is sent across
jurisdictional boundaries reduces productivity, disrupts the work
force, and necessitates finding productive work for the special
employees who are relieved from duty when the machine leaves their
jurisdiction.
Amtrak asserts that its equipment
operators require training experience, and
recently purchased Unimat Interlocking
$900,000. However, Amtrak alleges it has
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is expensive and that
skill. The cost of the
Surfacing Tamper was
been restricted by its

labor agreements
investment.

from obtaining the maximum return

on such

According to Amtrak, the traveling gangs are popular because
of compressed work weeks, overtime opportunities, per diem payments
and the satisfaction of working with sophisticated, state-of-theart equipment.
BMWE Position
The BMWE contends that there is no need to change the existing
system of regional and system-wide gangs; that the employer has
been able to utilize its high technology equipment under agreement
between the parties; that employees should not be faced with the
burden of extended travel from their homes; and that 53 percent of
the employees do not return to traveling gangs.
Recommendation
The evidence is persuasive that high-technology equipment such
as the Unimat Interlocking Surfacing Tamper requires employees who
are trained and skilled in its operation.
We recommend that
geographical restrictions on the use of traveling gangs working on
high-technology equipment be eliminated throughout the Northeast.
6.

VACATION RULE

BMWE Position
The BMWE proposes that full-time union officials be allowed to
accrue service for vacation eligibility, rather than having
vacation entitlement frozen at the levels in effect when they went
to work for the organization. It would make the benefit applicable
to any employee who has been on union leave of absence since July
1, 1988, retroactive to the date such leave began. It argues that
the current practice imposes an unfair financial impediment on
those opting to work for the BMWE, and discourages such union
activity. It notes that the employees affected would still be
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required to achieve eligibility for vacation on their return to
regular employment and that the proposal would affect only the
quantum of vacation entitlement.
The BMWE further proposes that employees be entitled to take
their vacations in one-day increments.
It declares that such a
benefit is desirable for employees who need to attend to personal
affairs from time to time, noting that such benefit is currently
provided to employees on commuter lines.
Amtrak Position
Amtrak objects to both proposals. It argues that the unionbusiness credit would force Amtrak to reward an employee with
vacation credits even though it gains no benefits from the
employee's labor.
It asserts the proposal is for a gratuitous
advantage and would urge its denial as well as the denial of the
claim for retroactivity.
On the issue of the daily vacation increments, Amtrak asserts
that the December 17, 1941, National Vacation Agreement does not
contemplate taking vacation in less than weekly increments, and
this is essential to facilitate the carrier's scheduling of work
with expectation of full crews being available for the full
workweek.
Recommendation
The BMWE proposal for continued accumulation of vacation
credit while on leave of absence for union business would provide
appropriate recognition of the employees' seniority with the
carrier and place them on a vacation level approximating that of
their peers who did not go on union leaves of absence. Because
Amtrak has recognized the retention of seniority and employment
status of employees on union leave of absence, and because
entitlement to such vacation in any particular year is dependent on
the employee's fulfillment of the work requirements for eligibility
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that year, we recommend that the benefit be adopted, but without
the retroactivity proposed by the BMWE.
On the issue of single-day vacation increments, we do not
believe the BMWE has presented a persuasive case. Vacation,
particularly for those who spend such extended periods away from
home, should be taken for its avowed purpose: to provide extended
periods of rest and rehabilitation with families, at home, and away
from work. Employees currently have available two personal days
for purposes addressed in the BMWE proposal. Vacation periods, we
believe, should be confined to five-day increments.
The BMWE
proposal on this issue should be withdrawn.
7.

CLOTHING ALLOWANCE

BMWE Position

The BMWE seeks partial compensation for safety shoes and
clothing that wear out at work. It asserts that the work of the
maintenance of way employees often involves working with substances
that are destructive of clothing; that the current allowance for
payment of work shoes is inadequate; and that there is
justification in increasing the allowance for both clothing and
safety shoes. It seeks an allowance of $250 per year.
Amtrak Position
Amtrak takes the position that the current allowance levels
are appropriate for both safety shoes and clothing; that shoes and
clothes are not usually provided by employers in the industrial
sector; that they both have use outside the work environment; and
that the BMWE's proposal should be denied.
Recommendation
We do not believe an adequate case has been made out for
requiring Amtrak to provide work clothing for bargaining-unit
members. That portion of the claim should be withdrawn. However,
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we do believe that the allowance for safety shoes, which has
remained unchanged since 1988, should be raised in recognition of
the increasing cost of such items in the intervening years. We
recommend that the allowance for safety shoes be increased to $60
per year, payable at the first of the year.
8.

WORK CLASSIFICATION SIMPLIFICATION

V

Position
Amtrak points out that at the present time there are over 70
different classifications or positions listed in Section B of the
Scope and Work Classifications Rule of the Amtrak/BMWE (NEC)
Agreement. According to Amtrak, many of these are archaic and not
used, and others perpetuate arbitrary distinctions unrelated to the
skills that could be expected of an employee. The carrier proposes
to simplify and standardize the classifications on the Amtrak
system and make them consistent with modern work practices.
Amtrak also proposes the creation of the Technician
classification in the track subdepartment . It alleges that this
classification
would
encompass both the
operation and
repair/maintenance of highly mechanized and complex equipment.
Amtrak explains that the Technician classification is not intended
to replace the Repairman classification, but rather to work in
concert with it.
Amtrak also proposes one classification for track welding.
Presently, track welding is separated into Electric Arc,
Oxygen/ Acetylene, and Thermit categories. Amtrak argues that by
combining all track welding into one classification, new job
opportunities will open up for the existing senior welders, and
future technological developments will not disadvantage current
employees. Amtrak states that it is committed to providing further
necessary training.
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The proposed classification structure includes a combination
B&B Mechanic/Trackman classification.
Amtrak notes that this
classification has been in use in Florida, under the Amtrak/BMWE
(Corp) Agreement, since January 15, 1985, and has proved to be a
cost-effective agreement that has functioned without complaint from
the BMWE. The carrier notes that similar agreements with the BMWE
have recently been reached for the Los Angeles and San Jose,
California, Commuter Services.
Amtrak points out that its proposal would not reduce the pay
rated for any existing employee.
When rates are rationalized,
employees whose pay rates would otherwise be reduced will be "red
circled" until such time as their pay rates are exceeded by those
under this proposal.
BMWE Position
The BMWE acknowledges
the benefits of classification
simplification.
Rather than eliminate vacant classifications,
however, it urges that they be merged with other classifications,
in order to protect the employees' right to such work in the
future. In addition it opposes the creation of new classifications
such as Technician and B&B Mechanic/Trackman.
Recommendation
The Board recommends that instead of being eliminated, vacant
classifications be merged with those that are active. We recommend
the establishment of the new classifications proposed by Amtrak.
We are persuaded that this will be cost-effective and that the
employees will not be adversely affected economically or in terms
of job security.
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9.

WORKSITE REPORTING

Amtrak Position
Amtrak proposes that the workday for BMWE employees begin and
end at the worksite in the same manner that it does for nonrailroad
employees, who commute one to two hours each way to their jobs.
Amtrak points out that current rules require pay to begin and
end at established headquarters or camp cars, instead of at the
worksite. The carrier also notes that headquartered employees may
actually have a shorter commute with the change, which is estimated
to save over $3.4 million per year.
Amtrak also proposes that gangs which have consistent or at
least readily predictable worksites report in advance of starting
times to assembly points near such worksites, where they would be
transported by Amtrak to the job. Again, the carrier points out
that the employees' pay would start and stop at the worksite.
Amtrak cites a recent agreement with the Brotherhood of
Railroad Signalmen, which incorporated such principles in the
worksite reporting provision of their Construction/Rehabilitation
Gang Rule.

BMWE Position
The BMWE would agree that employees housed in hotels and fed
in restaurants should be required to assemble 15 minutes in advance
of a bulletined starting time and not draw pay until after such
assembly time. This would obviate the need for employees to spend
hours of commuting each day, so that the carrier can avoid the
inconvenience of moving temporary lodging to maintain close
proximity to daily worksites.
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We believe that it is unfair and unreasonable for an employee
to report to headquarters or a camp car and then be required to
travel two hours to a worksite without compensation. We recommend
that the specific Amtrak proposal be withdrawn, but do recommend
that the employees be paid for all travel time in excess of 15
minutes from established headquarters or camp cars to the worksite,
and also be paid for all travel time, less 15 minutes, from the
worksite to established headquarters or camp cars.
10.

TRAINING PROGRAM

Amtrak Position
Amtrak contends that under the present training scheme
employees have the freedom to bid into training programs from any
location on the system, but no obligation to take the position for
which trained.
It asserts that instead of junior employees
benefiting from the training, it is invoked by the more senior
employees as a break from regular tasks or to learn a new skill as
a hedge against furlough. This practice, it continues, wastes from
$2,000 to $13,500 per person per course in training costs, inasmuch
as only 30 percent of those trained take the positions, thus
depriving the employer of the skills which the training program was
designed to fill. The carrier proposes limiting the bidding for
such training to the work zone where the skill need exists. It
also proposes giving preference in selection to the lower-rated
employees in the specific area and subdepartment, and requiring, in
the absence of any bid for the skill in which trained, that the
employer have the right to lock a trained employee into the
position for from nine to 12 months.
It would also restrict
compensation to eight hours of pay per day of training and travel.
BMWE Position
The BMWE objects to Amtrak's attempts to restrict access to
such training, and to its effort to deprive senior employees of the
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training opportunities. It also objects to the carrier's proposal
to force trainees into any position, location, or shift it wishes.
It proposes that the present compensation of 24 continuous hours
for travel time be retained.
Recommendation
Although we are unwilling to deprive employees throughout the
system, regardless of their seniority, of their present right to
bid for available training opportunities, the evidence indicates
that the present training procedure has failed to provide
management with the necessary number of trained employees to
fulfill its needs.
We believe that Amtrak is entitled to a
reasonable expectation that its skill needs will be met by those
who have completed the training. Accordingly, we recommend that
access to such training be retained in its present form, including
compensation for the time spent in travelling thereto, but that in
the absence of any acceptable bidders for vacancies in such
positions, the employer have the right to select one of the three
most junior employees who have completed such training for
assignment to the vacant position, with the understanding that the
employee remain therein for a minimum period of one year.
11.

CLAIMS AND GRIEVANCES

Amtrak Position
Amtrak proposes that the BMWE be required to progress claims
denied by the carrier's highest officer within 90 days, instead of
nine months. Amtrak also proposes that all appeals should state
the grounds for the appeal and the reason why previous claim
responses were not acceptable.
Amtrak contends that the BMWE continues to file grievances
similar if not identical to previous claims that have proceeded to
arbitration and been denied by arbitrators. Amtrak points out that
it is less expensive to pay the claim than it is to take the claim
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to arbitration.
The carrier contends the disciplinary process
suggested by the BMWE is unnecessary.
BMWE Position
The BMWE has proposed the discovery type rule in order to
quickly determine whether a grievance/claim is valid; this would
require the carrier to supply all relevant information to the
organization. The BMWE requests that the carrier provide it with
all documents which will be used in the disciplinary hearings at
least five days prior to the investigation, and that the carrier be
compelled to bring all witnesses necessary to investigations.
The BMWE contends that the Railway Labor Act requires nine
months and the reduction from nine months to 90 days might not only
be in violation of the Act but would also place the onus on the
member to move quickly in the event the organization chooses not to
pursue his/her case. The BMWE states that it does provide reasons
why previous claim responses were not acceptable in conference with
the carriers. It insists that the process is technical enough as
it now stands.
Finally, the BMWE proposes that the Agreement include clear
language with strict guidelines relating to when employees are
removed from service.

We recommend that the nine months presently allowed to
progress claims be reduced to 90 days, which we believe to be an
adequate period of time for the parties to process the claim. The
employee may not be knowledgeable about the process but he or she
has ready access to the assistance of the local chairman in
processing the claim.
Amtrak's proposal that all appeals should state the grounds
for the appeal and the reason why previous claims were not
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acceptable should be withdrawn. Such a requirement places an
excessive burden on the employee or the organization without
appreciable benefit to the process.
The BMWE has urged that it be provided, five days in advance,
with copies of all documents the carrier intends to submit at the
investigation. That arrangement would provide the BMWE with an
opportunity to determine the validity of the claim, and perhaps
lead to settlement or withdrawal of claims.
The BMWE contends that it is now required to bear the expense
of some witnesses whom it deems to be necessary for the defense of
the accused. The carrier is currently required to bear the expense
of all "necessary" witnesses.
We recognize that there is a
difference of opinion as to who is a "necessary" witness, which
will be resolved on appeal.
We recommend that the carrier be required to supply five days
prior to the hearing all documents to be used in any investigation;
that the present language providing a nine-month period for
progressing claims denied by the carrier's highest officer be
reduced from nine months to 90 days; that the present language
requiring the presence of necessary witnesses be retained without
change; and that the present language regarding removal of
employees from service be retained without change.
12.

SAFETY

BMWE Position
The BMWE proposes a joint labor-management Health and Safety
Committee, composed of an equal number of management and union
representatives. The organization also proposes creation of a
joint labor/management Health and Safety Committee in each BMWE
seniority district.
Finally, the BMWE proposes that employee
members of the committee shall be paid at their regular rate for
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any time required to investigate and meet on safety and health
problems.
Amtrak Position
Amtrak contends that the proposed committee would be
burdensome and unnecessaryIt also asserts that the present
safety committee has performed well and that Amtrak has an
extremely good safety record.
Recommendation
The evidence is persuasive that the present safety program has
improved substantially. We do no favor the proposals for change
made by the BMWE and recommend that they be withdrawn.
13.

NORTHEAST CORRIDOR AGREEMENT

Amtrak Position
Amtrak seeks to eliminate meals, lodging, and travel
allowances currently provided to certain production and other
special gangs, and to substitute therefor a flat $29 per diem
allowance.
BMWE Position
BMWE contends that the allowance is inadequate to compensate
employees for actual out-of-pocket expenses that would be incurred
if housing and meals were no longer provided.
Recommendation
The increased cost of lodging and meals along the northeast
corridor would suggest that the allowance of $29 in place of meals
and lodging would not suffice. While we are unwilling to agree to
the full reimbursement of the cost of meals and lodging, we do
believe an increase to $35 is warranted, and so recommend.
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14.

ELIMINATION OF ARBITRARIES

Amtrak Position
Amtrak proposes that payment of eight hours' minimum for
"Protect Service" under the Northeast Corridor Agreement Rule 54 be
eliminated; that Rule 30 be amended to provide that when changing
from standard time to daylight saving time, employees working one
hour less be compensated for actual hours worked, and when standard
time is restored, employees be compensated actual time worked at
straight time; and that employees called in for work not continuous
with their regular assignment be compensated for actual time worked
on a per-minute basis.
Amtrak argues that arbitrary payments, which include "Protect
Service" assignments under Rule 54 of Amtrak/BMWE (NEC) Agreement,
reflect time not worked by employees for which compensation should
not be received.
Also, Amtrak urges that special payments
associated with changing to and from daylight saving time should be
eliminated.
Amtrak points out that Rule 54, which is entitled "Protect
Service on Holidays or Employee's Rest Day," requires the payment
of eight hours at time and one-half if employees are required to
report to protect service. It notes that this rule is a carry-over
from the 1945 Pennsylvania Railroad Company-Maintenance of Way
Employees Agreement. According to Amtrak, this rule has been used
infrequently and is applicable only to employees required to report
for duty without specific assignment, to guard special train
movements, and simply to be promptly available in case of trouble.
It charges that an arbitration award on Amtrak years later
improperly enlarged the rule to apply it to a regular overtime
assignment.

-60-

BMWE Position
BKWE contends that the so-called arbitrary under the 1991
Agreement between the parties is not really an arbitrary, but is a
payment to employees who perform work under extraordinary
conditions. It points out that this work is generally done at a
time when employees should either be sleeping or attending to home
matters, and represents not only pay for work but also compensation
for substantial disruption of an employee's life. With reference
to service performed on holidays under Rule 54, the BMWE contends
that employees assigned to work on a holiday or a Sunday should be
guaranteed eight hours of work at time and one-half.
The BMWE urges that the provisions of current Rule 53(a) of
the Agreement should be modified to guarantee the employee four
hours of straight time when required to perform service outside of
and not continuous with the regularly assigned working hours. The
organization also rejects Amtrak's proposal to pay employees for
only 39 hours for the work week when daylight savings time begins.
It notes that employees base their budget on a 40-hour paycheck.
Recommendation
We recommend that all three of Amtrak's proposals be
withdrawn. Pursuant to Rule 54, an employee is and should continue
to be entitled to time and one-half compensation when performing
work on a holiday or rest day that would otherwise be spent at
home.
We see no reason to depart from the parties' negotiated
arrangement to accommodate to change of hours on moving in and out
of daylight saving time. It would be unfair to reduce the weekly
take-home pay in the spring, or to deprive employees of the
negotiated right to time and one-half after eight hours under the
overtime rule.
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Amtrak's proposal regarding employees being compensated for
actual time worked on a per-minute basis in connection with work
not continuous with their assignment is not justified.
Interruption of off hours has a substantial detrimental effect on
personal time. We recommend that employees be paid for a minimum
of four hours under such circumstances, and for actual time worked
beyond four hours.
15.

INTRACRAFT WORK

Amtrak Position
Amtrak proposes that when intracraft work of an incidental
nature is performed, employees will be paid only the rate of their
position.
Amtrak states that it is not attempting to eliminate
distinctions between jobs within the BMWE. The carrier points out
that under the Scope and Work Classification Rules, employees of
one classification may perform work of another classification. It
states that this is reiterated in Rule 58, with the proviso that
employees filling higher-rated positions must be paid at the rate
of the higher classification.
Amtrak states that despite the clear contract language, 12
disputes were progressed through three steps of the grievance
procedure last year, but the organization did not bring one of
these claims to arbitration. It objects that the meritless claims
constitute a total waste of effort and resources.
Amtrak states that it should be able to assign incidental
intracraft work without dispute or employee expectation of
increased payments. Moreover, it argues that incidental work is
not equivalent to filling a position and should not be compensated
as such.
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Amtrak asks for explicit recognition
that intracraft
assignments shall not be the basis of time claims. It believes
that recognition of these intracraft work principles would be
consistent with those enumerated in the recent national settlement.
BMWE Position
The BMWE refers to the following language in the current Scope
Rule paragraph (e):
. . . The listing of the various classifications is not
intended to require the establishment or the prevent the
abolishment of positions in any classification, nor to
require
the
maintenance
of
positions
in
any
classifications.
The listing of work under a given
classification is not intended to assign work exclusively
to that classification. It is understood that employees
of one classification may perform work of another
classification subject to the terms of existing rules or
agreement between the parties hereto.
It states that since Amtrak's inception in 1976 this language
has existed in the current agreement, and that it is virtually
identical to the language in the imposed national agreement-titled
"Intracraft Work Rule". The organization believes that the language
in the current agreement provides management with extreme
flexibility to work employees out of or across classifications. It
also suggests that Amtrak is trying to create a discipline and
claims process under which no discipline or claims could be
processed.
Recommendation
We agree with Amtrak that it has the right under the Scope and
Work Classification Rules to require BMWE employees of one
classification
to perform work of another classification.
Moreover, we are persuaded that when work of an incidental nature
is performed, employees performing such work should receive the
applicable rate of their position only. Rule 58 requires that
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employees be upgraded when "filling" a higher-rated position.
However, upgrading is not required and should not be expected when
an employee is asked to perform work incidental to his or her own
duties or service, which has been traditionally associated with
another higher-rated classification. Performing incidental work of
this nature should not constitute a basis for any time claims by or
on behalf of the employees performing the work or by other
employees. Should an employee be assigned to fill a higher-rated
position, that employee continues to have the right to be paid at
the rate of the higher classification, as required by the
agreement, and has the right to have a time claim filed and
progressed.
We recommend that Amtrak's proposal be adopted and applied
according to the above discussion.
16.

INTERCRAFT WORK

Amtrak Position
Amtrak proposes that work may be assigned to BMWE-represented
employees even if not traditionally associated with that craft; and
that work traditionally "owned" by the BMWE may be assigned to
other crafts.
It states that the purpose of this proposal is
twofold: to preempt disputes over what exactly is "traditionally
associated" with the BMWE craft; and to promote a concept of
teamwork that will provide for the efficient use of personnel and
cost-effective, quality service.
Amtrak states that it is not uncommon in the maintenance area
for employees to have skills that transcend the artificial work
assignment barriers created by the labor agreements. The carrier
identifies certain employee utilization agreements it has
negotiated with other unions as support for the developing
acceptance of the employee utilization concept.
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Amtrak proposes that it will not furlough employees in service
on the date of this agreement as a result of the implementation of
this proposal.
BMWE Position
The BMWE considers Amtrak 's proposal to be most problematic.
It states that it is an attempt to permit bargining unit work
defined by the BMWE's scope rule to be performed by anyone at
management's discretion. The BMWE believed this proposal to be a
serious attack on the integrity of its collectve bargaining
agreement with Amtrak.

We are not persuaded by Amtrak 's position. If Amtrak were
allowed to assign work traditionally assigned to the BMWE craft to
other crafts, and if Amtrak were allowed to assign the work of
other crafts to the BMWE, at its discretion, the craft lines of all
of the affected labor organizations would be destroyed. A much
more substantial record than that presented by the carrier would be
needed to support such a proposal.
We recommend that Amtrak 's
proposal be withdrawn.
17 . WORKWEEK
Amtrak Position
Amtrak proposes that any two or three consecutive days may be
designated as rest days so that maintenance of way work can be
scheduled on the days when work can be done most efficiently.
Present workweek rules require Amtrak to give employees Saturday
and Sunday off when they are employed in an operation that works
five days a week, but Amtrak has an agreement with the Special
Construction Gang permitting weekend work with weekday rest days.
Amtrak cites figures showing heavy commuter traffic at Pennsylvania
Station in New York City, 30th Street Station in Philadelphia,
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Union Station in Washington, South Station in Boston, and Union
Station in Chicago.
Amtrak notes that some of those stations
maintain seven-day coverage for the purpose of general maintenance
and protection against potential breakdowns.
Amtrak, however,
cannot presently assign additional BMWE-represented B&B mechanics,
plumbers, or similar craftsmen to a project that would take
advantage of the weekends or evenings, when passenger traffic is
comparatively light, without incurring overtime.
Amtrak proposes that it should have the option to establish
compressed workweeks, rather than schedule five, eight-hour days,
when conditions make them appropriate. At present, it may schedule
four-day weeks of 10-hour days only for traveling gangs. It argues
that longer shifts (e.g., 10 hours) would permit Amtrak to take
advantage of the 9:00 pm to 6:00 am light-traffic period.
BMWE Position
The BMWE denies the operational need for any change.
It
asserts that the existing rules provide the flexibility sought by
Amtrak. The organization argues that it can work Saturday as a
regular day if the need is shown. The BMWE rejects the idea of
straight-time pay for 10-hour days away from home, eight days in a
row; it objects to giving Amtrak what it calls carte blanche to
create chaos in employees' work lives, and urges that the proposal
be denied.
Recommendation
The great number of passengers during working hours results in
excessive interruptions to crews doing essential maintenance tasks.
The proposal by Amtrak would result in substantial savings and
increased ease of performing essential maintenance work. On that
basis, we recommend that Amtrak be permitted to schedule four-day
weeks of 10 hours per day, provided that there is one Saturday or
Sunday rest day per week.
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18.

STARTING TIME

Amtrak Position
Amtrak proposes that it be given discretion to schedule and
adjust the starting times for BMWE-represented employees to meet
the exigencies of service, subject to the restriction that, except
in emergencies, employees will receive adequate notice of any
change in their starting times or workweeks.
Amtrak notes that at the present time the starting times of
assignment must be between 6:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m. The carrier has
negotiated some relief from these restrictions for its special
construction gangs under the 1976 Special Construction Gang
Agreement.
It points out that presently the vast majority of
employees must be scheduled to work at times when because of train
traffic, they will be the least productive.
Amtrak proposes that it be allowed to schedule work at any
time without penalty. It declares that it is difficult to schedule
work between 6:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m. as specified by the contract.
It asserts that the weekday train traffic on the Northeast Corridor
is so heavy that work during the day is constantly disrupted, and
it argues that working during light traffic hours would be both
safer and more productive.
BMWE Position
The BMWE takes the position that there is no showing of any
operational need for changes in the present structure of starting
times; that there could be abuses in granting Amtrack the right to
start gangs at any time without penalty; and that the carrier is
able to achieve its necessary scheduling with the present schedules
and rules for starting times.
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The evidence of the pressures of continual train traffic on
its routes where trains pass every 15-30 minutes persuades us of
the need for Amtrak to have greater flexibility in starting its
crews. We recommend that it be given the right to commence crew
workdays at any time. For those starting times other than existing
starting times crew members will receive $.55 per hour in addition
to their regular compensation.
19.

OVERTIME

Amtrak Position
Amtrak proposes that overtime should not be paid until the
employee has completed 40 hours in a week.
BMWE Position
The BMWE contends that for many years the agreement has
included overtime for all time worked over eight hours and that
there is no justification for modifying that overtime rule.
Recommendation
It appears to us that this issue may have been withdrawn by
Amtrack. If not, we see no persuasive reason for departure from
the present commitment of both parties to adhere to the overtime
rule for those employees currently working a five-day eight-hour
per day work week. We see a different situation for employees who
will be working a routine four-day week of 10 hours per day. For
them, we recommend that overtime be paid after 10 hours' work per
day or after 40 hours' work per week.
20.

PAID HOLIDAYS

Amtrak Position
Amtrak seeks the deletion of one holiday.
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BMWE Position
The BMWE seeks the addition of a holiday commemorating the
birth of Martin Luther King, Jr.
Recommendation
We believe the current complement of holidays is consistent
with the practice under other collective bargaining agreements in
the industry, and do not believe any increase or decrease is
merited.
21.

COMBINED SENIORITY DISTRICTS

Amtrak Position
Amtrak proposes that the geographic boundaries between the
various seniority districts in the northeast be removed. It argues
that the present boundaries make no sense and result in illogical
restrictions on the use of employees; that seniority districts
generally limit the use of employees beyond specific geographic
boundaries; and that the efficient assignment of routine
maintenance, even within communities, is restricted by seniority
districts. Amtrak points out that in the vicinity of Boston and
New York City, when work needs to be done which is just on the
other side of a district line from the working employees, that work
cannot be performed by them, but employees must be brought from
miles away to perform it. Moreover, Amtrak asserts that employees
would gain job stability and more opportunity to work under its
proposal. Finally, Amtrak states that it is willing to provide the
current employees in each of the present seniority districts with
preferential treatment when exercising seniority in their current
district.
BMWE Position
The BMWE takes the position that under the Amtrak proposal,
employees would have to travel much further distances, and would
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eliminate traditional ties to the carrier and the area where they
provide service. The organization points out that at present there
are two large territories, and that Amtrak already has the right to
run some crews in both.
Recommendation
The evidence indicates that the present boundaries result in
unreasonable restrictions to the efficient operation of the
carrier.
The maintenance of way forces in the East are divided in four
seniority districts and covered by two collective bargaining
agreements. We recommend that geographic boundaries between the
various seniority districts be removed, and that Amtrak be reguired
to provide current employees in each of the present seniority
districts with preferential treatment (prior rights) when
exercising seniority in their current districts.
H.

APPLICABLE TO IAM
1.

SUBCONTRACTING

IAM Position
The IAM proposes that Amtrak adopt Article II of the 1964
Agreement with the recommendations imposed by PEB 219, but with
extensive restrictions. The IAM states that this protection is
needed because Amtrak contracts out a great deal of work that has
been performed by Amtrak machinists, or that should be performed by
Amtrak machinists.
The IAM requests that the issue of electrical power purchase
agreements (EPPAs) be addressed separately. It requests that EPPAs
be outlawed, or put under the umbrella of the September 25, 1964,
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Agreement. Alternatively, it requests that its Section 6 notice on
EPPAs be exempt from the moratorium provision of the Report.
Amtrak Position
Amtrak states that it is not a party to the September 25,
1964, Agreement. It refers to 45 U.S.C. Section 565 (e) (1), which
it states is the subcontracting provision by which it is governed,
and which also contains a no-furlough statutory guarantee relating
to subcontracting. Amtrak states that the IAM has not shown that
Amtrak has abused subcontracting to the detriment of the IAM.
Recommendation
45 U.S.C. Section 565(e)(l) states:
(e) Contracts not to result in layoff
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this
subsection, the Corporation shall not contract out any
work normally performed by employees in any bargaining
unit covered by a contract between the Corporation or any
railroad providing intercity rail passenger service on
October 30, 1970, and any labor organization, if such
contracting out shall result in the layoff of any
employee or employees in such bargaining unit.
The record indicates that when Amtrak has
subcontracting, it has adhered to the statutory
guarantee.

engaged in
no-furlough

Based on Special Board 102-29's response to Shopcraft Request
No. 4, which determined that EPPAs are within the scope of the
September 25, 1964, Agreement, it is now established that EPPAs are
considered a form of subcontracting.
Thus, lAM-represented
employees would be protected from furlough under the statutory
guarantee should Amtrak pursue such an arrangement.
Accordingly, the Board recommends that the IAM proposal on
subcontracting, including its Section 6 notice on EPPAs, be
withdrawn.
-71-

2.

JOB CLASSIFICATION

IAM Position
The IAM seeks a recommendation that eliminates the Mechanical
Technician classification or, alternatively, makes such a
classification subject to the bidding and bumping provisions of the
agreement.
The organization states that Amtrak has abused the
selection of employees for this classification, causing an employee
morale problem.
According to the IAM, the Mechanical Technician was a kind of
lead mechanic, and the position was created for the purpose of
instructing. Subsequently, the IAM was able to get language in its
agreement with Amtrak on this classification that specifically
required that mechanical technicians had to be instructing others.
According to the IAM, the present rule states that all things being
equal, the most senior individual is supposed to be the technician,
but staff management has the discretion to decide whether or not to
select that person, and the organization does not have a right to
challenge the decision. The IAM seeks a recommendation requiring
Amtrak to utilize the Field Technician - Train Riders machinist
classification across the entire Amtrak system.
Amtrak Position

Amtrak states that it has dealt with the issue of skill
differentials among shopcraft employees by establishing wage
differentials.
The carrier states in respect of the Field Technician - Train
Riders classification that the work is currently performed by other
crafts and by management. Moreover, Amtrak points out that the
IBEW represents a significant number of train riders across the
Amtrak system.
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Recommendation
Inasmuch as the IAM entered into an agreement with Amtrak,
granting it certain unilateral rights regarding the selection of
employees for the Mechanical Technician classification, the
organization must show persuasive reasons why it should either be
released from this bilateral agreement or the agreement should be
changed.
The IAM has not shown any change in the instructional duties
of the job, nor has it shown any change in the carrier's need for
the classification from that which obtained when the bilateral
agreement was reached. Additionally, we are not persuaded by the
allegations of abuse in Amtrak's selection process.
We thus conclude that the IAM did not make out a persuasive
case to justify either its release from the agreement and allowing
for the elimination of the Mechanical Technician or modification of
the agreement. The record before us shows that the IAM has four
differentials, the JCC "several" and the IBEW eight. It would be
destabilizing to the current structure of the shopcrafts were the
Board to recommend that the Mechanical Technician classification be
subject to the changes proposed by the IAM.
Because the IAM does not represent all train riders on the
Amtrak system, a basis does not exist to recommend that Amtrak
assign machinist Field Technician - Train Riders across the entire
system. Accordingly, the Board recommends that both IAM proposals
be withdrawn.
3.

SUPERVISORS' SENIORITY RETENTION

IAM Position

The IAM seeks to revise Article VII - Seniority Retention, of
the December 18, 1987, Agreement to provide that supervisors must
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pay a fee equivalent to monthly IAM membership dues to retain or
accumulate seniority.

Amtrak Position
Amtrak does not present a position on this proposal.
Recommendation
PEB 211 addressed the matter of supervisors' seniority
retention in its Report. It recommended in part that "person[s]
promoted on or after October 1, 1986 must pay the appropriate fee
to retain or accumulate seniority." We recommend that the IAM
proposal be adopted to the extent that it requires supervisors to
pay the appropriate fee to retain or accumulate seniority.
4.

ADDITIONAL PAID HOLIDAY

IAM Position
The IAM proposes that Amtrak add an additional paid holiday by
granting each employee an additional day of paid personal leave.
Amtrak Position
Amtrak points out that the median number of holidays reported
in a Bureau of National Affairs survey is 11, and that Amtrak
already provides 11 paid holidays for its employees.
Recommendation
The record does not indicate that the machinists have fewer
paid holidays than other Amtrak employees or that the number of
paid holidays is out of line with what other machinists in the
railroad industry receive.
The Board recommends that the proposal be withdrawn.
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5.

AUTO TRAIN:

AGREEMENT FOR IAM

Amtrak Position
At present, machinists do not work on the auto train.
Amtrak proposes special provisions for such work. It states
that the IAM is the only organization representing mechanical
employees that has not entered into an auto train service
agreement. Amtrak argues that its proposal will put the IAM on the
same footing as the other shopcrafts in auto train service.
IAM Position
The IAM responds that there is no justification for Amtrak1s
seeking a separate, substandard agreement for machinists to service
the auto train. The IAM claims that such agreements do away with
its C-2 protection, the 40-hour workweek, the five-day workweek,
and overtime.
Recommendation
The Board is not prepared to require members of any
organization to work involuntarily in a special category of service
that offers conditions of employment different from those obtaining
elsewhere in the carrier's service. This is especially so in the
case of the auto train, inasmuch as this service has been run since
its inception without machinists.

The Board recommends that Amtrak's proposal be withdrawn.
6.

REVISION OF RULE 44

IAM Position
The IAM proposes to revise Rule 44 to provide that local
chairmen may investigate alleged violations of the collective
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bargaining agreement during regularly scheduled hours without loss
of time or service credit. The IAM believes that Amtrak changed
the longstanding practice in the industry in 1990 when it required
local chairmen to punch out to discuss any problem involving IAM
members, supervisors, or the collective bargaining agreement. The
organization wanted to strike over the matter, but a U.S. District
Court judge persuaded the parties to arbitrate. The arbitrator
upheld Amtrak's position. The organization points out that Amtrak
uses the local committee and the local chairman during regularly
scheduled working hours when it is to its benefit, such as taking
care of the realignment of forces or the administration of
overtime.
Amtrak Position
Amtrak does not present a position on this proposal.
Recommendation
In 1990 Amtrak arbitrated the issue of whether or not the
local chairman was entitled to investigate alleged violations of
the collective bargaining agreement during regularly scheduled
hours without loss of time or service credit. Amtrak's position
was upheld by the arbitrator. Especially in view of the award
rejecting the IAM position, the organization has the burden of
demonstrating to this Board that the representation rights of
employees are significantly impaired by requiring the local
chairman to punch out when investigating grievances. Because this
has not been shown, the Board recommends that the proposal be
withdrawn.
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7.

DISTRIBUTION OF AGREEMENTS

IAM Position
The IAM proposes that Amtrak print and distribute to each IAM
represented Amtrak employee a revised, consolidated copy of the
controlling collective bargaining agreement. It points out that
the most recent printed version of the Amtrak-IAM agreement is the
one effective September 1, 1977. The organization states that when
this type of printing is done in the railroad industry, the
railroads have always incurred the cost of providing employees with
copies of these agreements.
Position
Amtrak does not present a position on this proposal.

Recommendation
It is important that employees have an up-to-date agreement
which identifies employees' rights and responsibilities regarding
wages, hours, and working conditions. The Board recommends that
the IAM proposal be adopted.
I.

APPLICABLE TO IBEW
1.

SUBCONTRACTING

IBEW Position
The IBEW seeks to apply the provisions of Article II of the
September 25, 1964, Agreement, as revised and amended to date,
including the recommendations of PEB 219, with the exception that
neutrals should be appointed under the provisions of Section 3 of
the Railway Labor Act. The IBEW sets forth certain work that is
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not to be considered subcontracting; and identifies specific work
that must not be subcontracted. The IBEW recognizes, however, that
from time to time emergencies will exist; and it sets forth a
process for resolving those situations.
Amtrak Position
Amtrak states that it is not a party to the September 25,
1964, Agreement. It refers to 45 U.S.C. Section 565 (e) (1), which
it states is the subcontracting provision by which it is governed,
and which also contains a no-furlough statutory guarantee relating
to subcontracting. Amtrak states that it has not been shown that
it has abused subcontracting.
Recommendation
45 U.S.C. Section 565 (e)(1) states:
(e) Contracts not to result in layoff
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this
subsection,the Corporation shall not contract out any work
normally performed by employees in any bargaining unit covered
by a contract between the corporation or any railroad
providing intercity rail passenger service on October 30,
1970, and any labor organization, if such contracting out
shall result in the layoff of any employee or employees in
such bargaining unit.
There has been no showing in the record before this Board that
Amtrak has not lived up to its no-furlough statutory guarantee.
Moreover, it has not been demonstrated that Amtrak has abused its
subcontracting rights.
The Board recommends that the IBEW proposal be withdrawn.
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2.

ADDITIONAL PAID HOLIDAY

IBEW Position
The IBEW proposes that the Board recommend the birthday of
Martin Luther King, Jr. as a holiday. It states that such a
holiday is consistent with the Federal Government's holiday
schedule, and would also constitute recognition of the important
contributions made by American minorities to our society.
Amtrak Position
Amtrak states that it has offered to each organization to
exchange a personal holiday for the Martin Luther King, Jr.
holiday, and that all organizations have refused this offer. It
points out that the median number of holidays granted employees, as
reported in a Bureau of National Affairs survey is 11; Amtrak
already gives its employees 11 paid holidays.

Recommendat ion
The IBEW has not offered persuasive reasons why its request
for the additional holiday should be approved. We recommend that
the proposal be withdrawn.
J.

APPLICABLE TO JCC
1.

NEW CLASSIFICATION OF WORK RULE FOR CARMEN

JCC Position
The JCC requests that this Board recommend the adoption of the
new classification of work rule it proposes.
The rule is a
synthesis of current carmen rules on the national freight
railroads. The JCC states that the rule accurately describes the

-79-

work currently done by carmen on Amtrak. It asserts that Amtrak
has refused over the years to follow through on an initial
understanding Amtrak had reached with the JCC to adopt a national
classification of work rule.
Amtrak Position
Amtrak does not

present a position on this proposal.

Recommendation
The JCC concedes that the carrier has refused over the years
to agree to a national classification of work rule for carmen.
The rule proposed would give carmen exclusive right to all of the
work listed in it.
The JCC has not demonstrated that it
exclusively performs all of the listed work, systemwide. The Board
recommends that the proposal be withdrawn.
2.

PART-TIME COACH CLEANERS

Amtrak Position
Amtrak makes its part-time proposal applicable to both
mechanics and coach cleaners, subject to a cap on the number of
part-time positions, which is not to exceed 10 percent of the fulltime positions covered. Amtrak states that the use of part-time
positions would permit it to restructure its work assignments more
effectively to meet its servicing needs. Moreover, it points out
that part-time positions would also be useful as a supplement to
full-time forces where equipment is added to accommodate seasonal
service requirements.
In addition, it asserts, part-time coach
cleaners could be used to provide extra attention to cleaning food
service cars, and part-time positions would permit the
establishment of more full-time Monday-through-Friday positions.
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JCC Position
The JCC asserts that it would be absurd to extend the parttime rule to carmen, given the training and skill level necessary
to enter that craft. The JCC has offered a rule allowing for parttime coach cleaners under certain circumstances, with a requirement
that full-time positions be established if duties exceed four hours
in a 24-hour period.
RECOMMENDATION

It makes sense to allow part-time coach cleaners where there
is insufficient work for full-time positions.
The Board is
confident that the JCC and Amtrak can reach agreement on this
matter, setting forth in workable detail when and where part-time
coach cleaners may be used and when service requirements would
justify the establishment of full-time positions at the locations.
The Board recommends that only coach cleaners be employed
part-time, under the conditons set forth above.
3.

AUTO TRAIN: RULES 11 AND 13

JCC Position
By agreement dated August 31, 1983, Amtrak was permitted to be
exempt from Rule 11 (Workday and Workweek) and Rule 13 (Overtime),
in its auto train service. These exemptions were made at a time
when the auto train was operating three days per week. Currently,
the auto train operates on a regular, five-day-per-week schedule.
The JCC contends that there is no longer any reason for the
continued exemption from Rules 13 and 11.
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Arotrak Position
Amtrak states that the auto train service was and remains
unique; therefore, this service should continue to be exempt from
Rule 13 and Rule 11. It proposes that carmen be allowed to get to
overtime faster, by crediting certain payments for working on a
holiday towards overtime.
Recommendation
The mere fact that the auto train was operating three days a
week when the agreement between Amtrak and the JCC was signed in
August, 1983, and that it now operates five days a week, does not
provide a sufficient basis to change the Auto Train agreement
dealing with workdays and workweek. The JCC has not demonstrated
that the auto train agreement governing workdays and workweek was
based on a three-day operating schedule. We therefore recommend
that the JCC proposal to have Rule 11 apply to auto train service
be withdrawn.
The JCC proposal to have Rule 13 apply to JCC auto train
service would allow overtime to be paid under the Schedule
Agreement. We see no destabilizing effect in such a proposal.
Amtrak, in testimony before the Board, stated its willingness to
provide some overtime relief to the carmen, the IBEW, and the IBB&B
forces on the auto train. We think that stabilization would be
served by establishing rule parity between the JCC and the IBF&O,
which obtained the right in collective bargaining to be paid
overtime under the Schedule Agreement. We therefore recommend that
the JCC proposal on Rule 13 be adopted.
K.

APPLICABLE TO ALL PARTIES
1.

MORATORIUM

We recommend a moratorium period for all matters on which
notices might properly have been served when the last moratorium
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ended on July 1, 1988, to be in effect through January 1, 1995.
Notices for changes under Section 6 of the Railway Labor Act
accordingly may be served by any of the parties on another party no
earlier than November 1, 1994.
VII.

ISSUES NOT DEALT WITH

Any and all issues in dispute before this Emergency Board on
which there are no recommendations, or which are not mentioned in
this Report, shall be deemed withdrawn.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

These recommendations represent or best judgement on the
merits and equities of the issues in dispute. They also represent
our estimate of a fair and realistic package of conditions,
benefits, and benefit changes that, as a totality, should provide
a basis for a acceptable, overall settlement.
We think it would be unrealistic and a costly exercise in
futility for all concerned if our total recommendations did not
take into consideration, as a critical ingredient, their
acceptability by the parties.
Nevertheless, we think it
impacticable to ask that the parties adopt these recommendations
unconditionally and without modification. As the Railway Labor Act
does not make them binding, we expect that the parties will make
adjustments as needed, or if necessary, subject them to major
revision. In any case, we hope that we have provided a well-marked
road map for good faith use by the parties in completing their
contracts through the process of free collective bargining. We
express to the parties our profound thanks for the intelligent,
comprehensive, and professional presentation of their cases and for
their patience and cooperation with our procedures. We also
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acknowledge with thanks the assistance of Roland Watkins, the
Special Assistant to the Board.
Respectfully,

f'T
Benjamin Aaron, Chairman

Preston 3. Moore, Member

Eric J/ Schmertz, Membe

David P. Twomey, Member \

Arnofd M.Zack, Jf
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Appendix "A"

EXECUTIVE ORDER

- J 2 J 3 6.
ESTABLISHING AN EMERGENCY BOARD TO INVESTIGATE DISPUTES
BETWEEN THE NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION AND ITS
EMPLOYEES REPRESENTED BY' CERTAIN LABOR ORGANIZATIONS

Disputes exist between the National Railroad Passenger
Corporation and its employees represented by certain labor
organizations as designated on the attached list, which is made
a part of this order.
These disputes have not been adjusted under the provisions
of the Railway Labor Act, as amended (45 U.S.C. 151-188) ("the
Act").
In the judgment of the National Mediation Board, these
disputes threaten substantially to interrupt interstate corrunerce
to a degree that would deprive various sections of the country
of essential transportation service.
NOW, THEREFORE, by the authority vested in me as President:
by the Constitution and the laws of the United States, including
section 10 of the Act, it is hereby ordered as follows:
Section 1.

Creation of Emergency Board.

There is

created, effective April 3, 1992, a board of five members to
be appointed by the President to investigate the disputes.
No member shall be pecuniarily or otherwise interested in any
organization of railroad employees or any railroad carrier.

Tne

board shall perform its functions subject to the availability ;:
funds.
Sec. 2.

Report.

The board shall report to the President

on May 3, 1992, with respect to these disputes.
Sec. 3.

Maintaining Conditions.

As provided by section ::

of the Act, from the date of the creation of the board and f=r
30 days after the board has submitted its final report to the
President, no change in the conditions out of which the disputes
arose shall be made by the railroads or the employees, except =•/
agreement of these parties.

See. 4. Expiration. The board shall terminate upon the
submission of the report provided for in section 2 of this
order.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
March 31,

1992.

LABOR ORGANTZATIQNa
(NMB Cas« NOS. A-12309, A-12290, A-12198, A-12263, A-12268,
A-12318, A-12103, A-12246, A-12291, A-12467, and A-12391)

American Train Dispatchers Association
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers
Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes
International Association of Machinists &
Aerospace workers
International Brotherhood of Blacksmiths &
Boilermakers
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
International Brotherhood of Firemen & Oilers
Transport Workers Union
Transportation Communications Union - ARASA
Transportation Communications Union - Carmen Division
United Transportation Union

REPORT
TO

THE PRESIDENT
BY

EMERGENCY BOARD
NO. 220

Submitted Pursuant to Executive order No. 12794
Dated March 31, 1992
and Section 10 of
The Railway Labor Act, as Amended

Investigation bf disputes between CSX Transportation, Inc., and the
railroads represented by the National Carriers' Conference
Committee of the National Railway Labor Conference and their
employees represented
by the International Association of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers.
(National Mediation Board Case Nos.
A-11544, A-12250 and A-11071)

Washington, D.C.

May 28, 1992

Washington, B.C.
May 28, 1992

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. President:
On March 31, 1992, pursuant to Section 10 of the Railway Labor
Act, as amended, and by Executive Order 12794, you established an
Emergency Board to investigate disputes between CSX Transportation,
Inc., and certain railroads represented by the National Carriers'
Conference Committee of the National Railway Labor Conference and
their employees represented by the International Association of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers.
The Board now has the honor to submit its Report and Recommendations to you concerning an appropriate resolution of the disputes
between the above named parties.
Respectfully,

Benjamin Aaron, Chairman

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.

Creation of the Emergency Board

II.

Parties to the Dispute
A.
The Carrier's Conference

1
1
.1

B.

CSX Transportation, Inc

2

C.

The IAM&AW

2

III. Activities of the Emergency Board

2

IV.

History of the Dispute
A.
NLRC/IAM&AW

4
4

B.

CSX Transportation, Inc

5

C.

NMB's Recommendations

5

V.

Introduction

VI.

Issues, Positions of Parties and Recommendations . . . .
A.
Wages
B.
Health & Welfare
C.
Incidental Work Rule
D.
Subcontracting
E.
Successorship
F.
Southern Pacific Lines
G.
Moratorium

VII. Conclusion

7
10
10
14
15
17
20
21
22

22

I.

CREATION OF THE EMERGENCY BOARD

Emergency Board No. 220 (the Board) was established by the
President pursuant to Section 10 of the Railway Labor Act, as
amended, 45 U.S.C. § 160, and by Executive Order No. 12794. The
Board was ordered to investigate and report its findings and
recommendations
regarding
unadjusted
disputes
between
CSX
Transportation, Inc., and the National Carrier's Conference
Committee of the National Railway Labor Conference (NRLC) and their
employees represented
by the International
Association of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM). The Board was also ordered
to investigate and report its findings and recommendations
concerning a specific dispute between CSX Transportation, Inc. and
the IAM&AW. Copy of the Executive Order is attached as Appendix
"A."
On April 3, 1992, the President appointed Benjamin Aaron of
Santa Monica, California, as Chairman of the Board, Eric J.
Schmertz of Riverdale, New York, and David P. Twomey of Quincy,
Massachusetts, as Members. The National Mediation Board appointed
Roland Watkins, Esq., as Special Assistant to the Board.
II. PARTIES TO THE DISPUTE
A.

The Carriers' Conference

The carriers involved in this dispute include most of the
Nation's Class I line haul railroads and terminal and switching
companies. They are named in the attachment to Appendix "A". The
carriers are represented in this dispute through powers of attorney
provided to the NLRC and its negotiating committee (carriers).
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B.

CSX Transportation, Inc.

CSX Transportation, Inc. is a Class I line haul freight
railroad headquartered in Jacksonville, Florida.
C.

The IAM&AW

The IAM&AW represents approximately 7800 employees involved in
this dispute. This organization represents the craft or class of
the carriers' employees who maintain and repair (i) all types of
locomotive and freight cars, (ii) work equipment, and (iii) shop
machinery and equipment. These employees also operate and maintain
the carriers' stationary power plants and power stations.
III.

ACTIVITIES OF THE EMERGENCY BOARD

The parties to the dispute met with the Emergency Board in
Washington, D.C., on April 6, 1992, to discuss procedural matters.
On April 7-9, 1992, the Board conducted hearings regarding the
issues in Washington, D.C.
The parties were given full and
adequate opportunity to present oral testimony,
documentary
evidence and argument in support of their respective positions. A
formal record was made of the proceedings.
The parties agreed to and the President approved an extension
of the time that the Emergency Board had to report its
recommendations until May 28, 1992.
The IAM&W presented its position through written statements
and oral testimony by John F. Peterpaul, International Vice
President of the IAM&AW; Milton Jolly, General Chairman of the
IAM&AW on CSX Transportation, Inc.; Steven Thompson, machinist
employed by the Burlington Northern Railroad; Michael J. McCarthy,
machinists
employed
by
the
National
Railroad
Passenger

Corporations; Ron Acampora, road mechanic employed by the National
Railroad Passenger Corporation; Charles D. Easley, Grand Lodge
Representative for the IAM&AW; Thomas R. Roth, President of the
Labor Bureau, the Inc; and Ivy silver, Principal at Leshner, Silver
& Associates. The IAM&CAW, was represented by Joseph Guerrieri,
Jr., Esq., of guerrieri, Edmond and James.
The Carriers presented their position through written
statements and oral testimony by James A. Hagen, Chairman,
President and Chief Executive Officer of the Consolidated Rail
Corporation and Chairman of the Association of American Railroads;
Charles I. Hopkins, Jr., Chairman, National Carriers' Conference
Committee; Carl S. Sloane, Professor of Business Administration and
consultant to Mercer Management Consulting; Robert W. Anestis,
President of Anestis & Company; William E. Honeycutt, General
Manager Mechanical Facilities, Norfolk Southern Corporation;
Charles H. Fay, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Industrial Relations
and Human Resources, Institute of Management and Labor Relations,
Rutgers University, David S. Evans, Vice President of National
Economic Research Associates, Inc.; Joseph J. Martingale, Vice
President of Towers, Perrin, Forster & Crosby; Edward L. Bauer,
Jr., Assistant Chief Mechanical Officer, Burlington Northern
Railroad; Purtis Miller, Director of System Locomotive Shop, Union
Pacific Railroad; and Edward Latchford, of CSX Transportation, Inc.
The Carriers were represented by Ralph J. Moore, Jr., Esq., and
Benjamin W. Boley, Esq. of Shea and Gardner.
CSX Transportation presented its position through written
statements and oral testimony by David Miller, Assistant Vice
President - Mechanical Operations and Planning, CSX Transportation
Company; Edward Latchford, Vice President
- Finance, CSX
Transportation Company.
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Pursuant to the request of the Board, on April 27, 1992, the
parties presented written lists of the issues which they deemed
still in dispute before the Board.
After the close of the hearings, the Board met in executive
session to prepare its Report and Recommendations.
The entire
record considered by the Board in this dispute consists of
approximately six-hundred (600) pages of transcript and twentyseven hundred (2,700) pages of exhibits.
IV.

HISTORY OF THE DISPUTE
A.

NLRC/IAM&AW

By letter dated January 12, 1988, the NRLC advised the NMB
that the Health and Welfare issues from the previous 1984 Section
6 notice were unresolved and requested that the NMB reopen that
case (NMB Case No. A-11544) for further mediation. The NRLC, on
July 25, 1988, was informed by the NMB that the case was reopened
pursuant to its request. On October 27, 1989, the NMB notified the
parties that it would commence mediation of the remaining Health
and Welfare issues.
On or about January 20 and April 18, 1988, the IAM&AW, in
accordance with Section 6 of the Railway Labor Act, served notice
on the individual railroads of its demands for changes in the
provisions of numerous existing collective bargaining agreements.
The railroads, on or about August 17, 1988, served their notices on
the IAM&AW. The NRLC, on October 13, 1988, applied to the National
Mediation Board (NMB) for its mediatory service. The application
was docketed as NMB Case No. A-12250.
The NMB subsequently decided to conduct the mediation of the
unresolved 1984 and the current 1988 Health and Welfare issue
concurrently. Mediation of the non-Health and Welfare issues was
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undertaken by Member Joshua M. Javits and Mediators Samuel J.
Cognata and Richard A. Hanusz. A separate mediation on the Health
and Welfare issues was handled by Chairman Javits and Mediators
Robert J. Cerjan and Thomas R. Green. All of these efforts were
unsuccessful.
On March 2, 1992, the NMB, in accordance with Section 5,
First, of the Railway Labor Act, offered the IAM&AW and the NRLC
the opportunity to submit their controversy to arbitration. The
organization declined the proffer of arbitration. Accordingly, on
March 4, 1992, the NMB notified the parties that it was terminating
its mediatory efforts.
B.

CSX Transportation, Inc.

The IAM&AW, on or about October 30, 1981, served notice on CSX
Transportation of its demand for a change in the existing
collective bargaining agreements. On April 14, 1982, the IAM&AW
applied to the NMB for its mediatory service. The application was
docketed as NMB Case No. A-11071.
On March 2, 1992, the NMB, in accordance with Section 5,
First, of the Railway Labor Act, offered the IAM&AW and CSX
Transportation the opportunity to submit their controversy to
arbitration. The Organization declined the proffer of arbitration.
Accordingly, on March 4, 1992, the NMB notified the parties that it
was terminating its mediatory efforts.
C.

NMB's Recommendations

On March 5, 1992, pursuant to Section 10 of the Railway Labor
Act, the NMB advised the President of the United States that, in
its judgment, the disputes threatened to substantially interrupt
interstate commerce to a degree such as to deprive various sections
of the country of essential transportation service.
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The President, in his discretion, issued Executive Order 12794
on March 31, 1992, to create, effective April 3, 1992, this Board
to investigate and report concerning these disputes.
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V.

INTRODUCTION

The threshold question before us concerns the impact on this
Presidential Emergency Board 220 of the recommendations of PEB 219
as enacted by Congress, and as reviewed by the Special Board.
The same carriers currently before us were before PEB 219.
The organizations before PEB 219 represent about 95 percent of the
organized work force employed by the freight carriers.
The
International

Association

of

Machinists

(IAM),

the

single

organization before us in PEB 220, was not party to the PEB 219
proceedings; it represents an estimated five
organized work force on the Class I railroads.

percent

of

the

The unresolved contract issues before us between the carriers
and the IAM cover the same subjects as those considered by PEB 219.
The recommendations of PEB 219, as reviewed by the Special Board,
are in effect between the carriers and all organizations except the
IAM, either as the basis of settlements or as enacted by Congress.
They cover such matters as wages, health benefits, skill
differentials, incidental work rule, subcontracting, moratorium,
and successorship.
The

carriers'

position

is

that

the

findings

and

recommendations of PEB 219 constitute a pattern; they offered to
settle on that basis with the IAM. Recommendations more favorable
to the IAM would in their view be unfair to the vast majority of
employees

working

seriously

disturb

under
morale

the

PEB

and

219

orderly

recommendations;
labor

would

relations

by

establishing materially different conditions of employment among
employees who work "elbow-to-elbow", cause "leapfrogging, metooism,

and whipsawing" by other labor organizations

as they

competed with each other for superior benefits; and inevitably
result in destabilization of parity arrangements, historical
differentials, and established relationships.
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The carriers claim that there is a history of so-called
pattern bargaining in the railroad industry pursuant to which
substantive agreements covering significant groups of employees
have been replicated for other employees similarly situated. This
is particularly true, they say, as between the IAM and the
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW), which have
been in "lockstep" with each other, and which began bargaining
jointly in this round of negotiations.
Additionally, the carriers argue that on the merits, there is
no justification for recommendations favorable to the IAM that
exceed those proposed by PEB 219 on the same issues.
The IAM views this proceeding differently. It rejects the
pattern theory and asserts that it is entitled to a de novo inquiry
and a new set of recommendations by this Board on the merits of
each of the issues in dispute. It emphasizes its lawful right to
sever its bargaining from the IBEW and from other rail labor
organizations. It disagrees with the view that it is bound by the
recommendations of PEB 219, in whose proceedings it did not
participate.
In short, the IAM disputes the alleged history of pattern
applications in the railroad industry and rejects the claim that
the recommendations of PEB 219 themselves constitute a pattern. It
argues that a pattern does not emerge from terms and conditions
which, rather than being voluntarily negotiated, were imposed by
legislative fiat on 60 percent of the affected work force. It also
points to wage differences between operating and craft employees
that may well be changed if and when skill differentials are
determined either by this Board or by the Skills Committee
established pursuant to the recommendation of PEB 219. As far as
the IAM is concerned, the possibility of such changes negates any
notion of a presently existing pattern. Instead, it claims that
based on their job duties, skills and hazards, as well as on
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relevant economic data and occupational comparisons, the employees
it represents are entitled to the benefits and conditions sought,
irrespective of what PEB 219 recommended as the basis of settlement
for others. Finally, the IAM denies, for the previously stated
reasons, that
destabilizing.

any

such

results

on

the

merits

would

be

That the IAM was not party to the proceedings before PEB 219
is reason enough to conclude that the recommendations of that Board
do not constitute an automatically binding pattern on it. As a
present reality, however, effective for 95 percent of the
industry's employees, those recommendations cannot be ignored in
deciding the issues affecting the IAM.
The economic and bargaining relationships between the carriers
and the IAM and the other rail labor organizations, and the
hierarchical structure among the members of all the organizations
make the recommendations of PEB 219 relevant and material.
Certainly, the IAM was aware, when it elected to stay out of the
PEB 219 proceedings,
that specific findings of fact and
recommendations would be made that dealt with the identical issues
now in dispute between the carriers and the IAM, and that those
recommendations would apply to the overwhelming majority of the
unionized work force.
We consider it critical to the public interest that labor
relations and collective bargaining on the nation's railroads be
fair, stable, and reasonably consistent.
Conversely, we believe
that political competition between and among unions for supremacy
of benefits, with its ineluctably destabilizing consequences, is
damaging to the public interest.
Therefore, because the recommendations of PEB 219 are now in
effect for most of the unionized employees in the railroad
industry, we conclude that significant variations for the IAM-9-

represented employees that change previously linked or stabilized
economic and work relationships with other rail employees would
produce the destabilization that we think must be avoided. We
recognize, however, that exceptions may be made in special,
compelling circumstances.
The foregoing reasons justify, in our opinion, treating the
recommendations of PEB 219 as presumptively applicable to the IAM
and the carriers in this case, whether or not they are
characterized as a pattern.
The presumption, however, is a
rebuttable one.
We shall weigh all the factors in each issue
before us, including persuasive reasons, if any, why a given PEB
219 recommendation should not be made applicable to lAM-represented
employees. Ultimately, we must make each decision on the basis of
the total record before us.
VI.

ISSUES, POSITIONS OF PARTIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A.

WAGES

PEB 219 made the following general wage recommendations:
1.
A lump-sum payment of $2000 to each employee upon the
signing of the agreement.
2.
A 3-percent lump-sum payment effective July 1, 1991.
3.
A 3-percent lump-sum payment effective July 1, 1992,
which is to be considered as a cost-of-living adjustment
and not part of the wage base.
4.
A 3-percent lump-sum payment effective January 1, 1993,
which is to be considered as a cost-of-living adjustment
and not part of the wage base.
5.
A 3-percent general wage increase effective July 1, 1993.
6.
A 3-percent lump-sum payment effective January 1, 1994,
which is to be considered as a cost-of-living adjustment
and not part of the wage base.
7.
A 4-percent general wage increase effective July 1, 1994.
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8.

9.

A 2-percent lump-sum payment effective January 1, 1995,
which is to be considered as a cost-of-living adjustment
and not part of the wage base.
A cost-of-living adjustment for each 6-month period,
beginning July 1, 1995, based upon the COLA formula which
has previously been utilized by the parties.

In the case before PEB 220, the IAM proposes to modify that
formula as follows:
Machinists represented by the IAM seek to receive general wage
increases and COLAs, which are immediately rolled into the wage
base, according to the following schedule:
July 1, 1988
July 1, 1992
Effective date
July 1, 1992
January 1, 1993
January 1, 1994
January 1, 1995
Semiannual formula

10 percent
3 percent
$2000 retroactive lump sum
3 percent (rolled in COLA)
3 percent
3 percent (rolled in COLA)
2 percent (rolled in COLA)
COLAs commencing July 1, 1995

The carriers' proposal is to give the lAM-represented
machinists what PEB 219 recommended, except that the first threepercent general increase would not be effective until the date of
its new agreement with the IAM.
IAM Position
The IAM contends that the skilled workers it represents on the
railroads have fallen behind comparably skilled employees in other
industries. It also points out that since the expiration of the
last collective bargaining agreement in 1988, while machinists'
wages have been frozen on the railroads, the cost of living has
risen over 16 percent. The organization emphasizes that it is not
-11-

even seeking a full recovery of the real wages railroad machinists
have lost as a result of uncompensated increases in the cost of
living since 1978. According to its calculations, if its full wage
demand were granted, and assuming a 3.5-percent annual rate of
inflation throughout the balance of the contract period (i.e.,
until January 1, 1995), railroad machinists' real pay would be
restored only to the level that existed in January, 1978.
The IAM explains that the 10-percent general wage increase
included in its proposal reflects a "skill differential," but it
asserts that the 10-percent general increase is fully justified and
required, regardless of how it is characterized.
Anticipating a claim by the carriers that they cannot afford
to pay the wage increases it demands, the IAM asserts that the
carriers are not in economic distress.
It cites unprecedented
productivity increases, accelerating car loadings, reduction in
fuel prices, and recent helpful legislation among other factors
bolstering the railroads' financial position.
Carriers Position
The carriers view the recommendations of PEB 219 as a
constructive compromise, a balance between competing interests of
the parties:
wage increases versus productivity advances.
Questions
of pattern
aside, they believe that the wage
recommendations are fair and should apply to the machinists as well
as to the other shopcrafts already covered.
The key wage
comparison for the IAM, they insist, is with the railroad
shopcrafts, especially with the IBEW.
The carriers indicate a willingness to study the question
whether journeyman machinists should receive a skill differential
for specific work. They propose that any disagreement in that
regard be submitted to a neutral for arbitration.

-12-

Contrary to the IAM, the carriers warn that their financial
condition is perilous. They emphasize that while railroad workers'
compensation is at the peak of compensation in American industry,
the railroads are at the bottom of the heap in terms of
profitability, and that only a few have been able to realize a
return on their assets that exceeded the cost of capital. The
economic outlook for their industry, the carriers argue, is
anything but roseate. They foresee further inroads by the trucking
industry in their market share; a rise in both fuel prices and
taxes; and slower growth. They predict that the continued failure
to earn the cost of capital will curtail their ability to attract
sufficient funds to modernize equipment and provide service to
customers and jobs to employees.
Recommendations
As is apparent from our comments in the introduction to this
Report, we think it inappropriate to treat this case as if it
existed in a vacuum.
We cannot ignore the fact that labor
organizations representing 95 percent of the employees on the
freight railroads recently participated in proceedings before PEB
219, asked for general wage increases approximating what the IAM is
proposing, sought to justify such increases with arguments quite
similar to those advanced by the IAM in this case, and ultimately
accepted, or were statutorily bound by, the recommendations of PEB
219. However compelling the evidence adduced by the IAM in support
of its position may seem, if considered without regard to what has
occurred in the railroad industry in the past year, we are bound to
conclude that endorsement of the proposal for a 10-percent general
wage increase, even if limited to prospective application, would be
profoundly destabilizing to the present wage structure of the
railroad industry. We therefore decline to recommend it.
It may well be, as the carriers' own proposal implies, that
certain types of work performed by some railroad machinists should
receive a skill differential.
The IAM insists that such a
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determination can and should be made by this Board on the basis of
the ample record made before it. The carriers argue, however, that
a far more detailed study must be made of the issue than can
possibly be undertaken by this Board within the narrow time limits
within which it must complete its work. They urge that the entire
matter be referred to a body similar to the current Brotherhood of
Railroad Signalmen (BRS) Skill Differential Study Committee.
Although we sympathize with the lAM's desire to achieve a
speedy resolution of this protracted dispute, we agree with the
carriers that the matter of skill differential is best left to
study and determination by a tripartite committee headed by a
neutral, whose decision in the event of a deadlock between the
parties shall be final and binding. We leave it to the parties to
establish the committee.
In keeping with the general approach we have taken in respect
of the wage issue in this case, we recommend that the parties adopt
the general wage and cost-of-living increases and time schedule for
such wage adjustments recommended by PEB 219. Achievement of the
wage stability the carriers advocate can be attained only by making
the first three-percent general increase effective on the same date
(July 1, 1991) as that applicable to the organizations covered by
the PEB 219 recommendations. We see no reason why the IAM should
suffer any loss of retroactivity simply because it declined to
participate in the proceedings before PEB 219, which it had the
legal right to do.
B.

HEALTH AND WELFARE

IAM Position
The IAM seeks a separate plan for its members and their
dependents. Although the separate plan replicates the National
Plan as revised, the IAM insists that it be funded entirely by the
carriers, including any increased costs.
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Carriers Position
The carriers argue that the recommendation of PEB 219, as
clarified by the Special Board, and as applicable to all the other
organizations in contract with them, should be made applicable to
the IAM. Included, the carriers assert, are the numerous detailed
changes in the plan that are identical as to each union.
The
changes include provisions for employee cost-sharing commencing in
1993.
Recommendation
This is an issue that should be resolved on the basis of the
recommendation of PEB 219, as clarified by the Special Board, with
the changes applicable to the other organizations. To do otherwise
would create different health and welfare plans among employees of
the carriers, with different cost contributions by the employees.
The disaffiliation of the lAM-represented employees could detract
from the fiscal vitality of the National Plan, with the attendant
risk that benefits, experience-ratings, and costs may differ. We
think this would be destabilizing both to the relationships among
the employees and their representative organizations and to labor
relations between the carriers and those organizations.
The IAM proposal should be withdrawn, and the carrier
proposal, based on the PEB 219 recommendation, including the
sharing of cost increases, should be adopted.
C.

INCIDENTAL WORK RULE

Carriers Position
The carriers urge that the preexisting incidental work rule
should be amended, in accordance with the recommendations of PEB
219, to include "simple tasks" requiring no special training or
tools; to allow up to two additional hours of such work to be done
per shift by each craft employee; and to apply to all backshop
employees, as well as those in running repair locations.
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IAM Position
The IAM opposes PEB 219's proposed expansion of the
preexisting incidental work rule.
It sees the expansion of the
rule as an invasion of its scope rule. Under PEB 219's incidental
work rule, according to the lAM's version of what is happening, a
skilled machinist may well be replaced by a lower-rated employee,
including laborers or firemen and oilers, to fill positions on a
rotating two hour basis.
Recommendation
PEB 219's, recommendation on the incidental work rule reads in
part as follows:
...[We] are persuaded that the time has come
to eliminate some of the restrictions which
unnecessarily add time, costs, and delays to
the accomplishment of shopcraft work. To that
end, the Board recommends that:
(1) The
coverage of the rule be expanded to include
all Shop Craft employees and the back shops.
(2) "Incidental Work" be redefined to include
simple tasks that require neither special
training nor special tools. (3) The Carriers
be allowed to assign such simple tasks to any
craft employee capable of performing them for
a maximum of two hours per work day, such
hours not to be considered when determining
what constitutes a "preponderant part of the
assignment."
Special Board 102-29, in the clarification stage, dealt with
two questions, as follows:
Shop Craft Request No. 6
Does the PEB's recommended relaxation of existing
work rules allow the carriers to assign an unlimited
amount of such work across craft lines?
Clarification or Interpretation of the Special Board
The PEB intended to allow two hours of incidental
work per employee per shift.
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At the contract clarification stage of Special Board 102-29,
the Special Board chose the carriers' statement of the new
incidental work rule.
This Board has fully considered all of the lAM's views on the
new incidental work rule.
On the record before this Board, we
cannot justify allowing the machinists craft to deviate from the
PEB 219 pattern set forth above. It would be unworkable and unfair
if the preexisting incidental work rule were to continue to be
applied to the machinists, while all of the other shop craft
employees were subject to the new incidental work rule. The Board
recommends the adoption of the new incidental work rule, as
developed by PEB 219 and Special Board 102-29.
D.

SUBCONTRACTING

IAM Position
The IAM offers a series of proposals, "to strengthen the
recommendations of PEB 219." The General Chairman representing the
IAM employees of CSX Transportation Company (CSXT) presented a
statement that he says applies with equal force to the dispute
between the IAM and the other carriers as well as to the dispute
between the IAM and CSXT.
The IAM proposes the following
modifications to Article II of the September 25, 1964, Agreement
on Subcontracting:
a.

Prohibit the continuing or permanent transfer
of Machinists' work to third parties without
prior agreement with the IAM.

b.

Prohibit the subcontracting of work
qualified Machinists are on furlough.

c.

Redefine cost criteria for subcontracting to
exclude overhead costs and other costs not
directly associated with the work in question.
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while

d.

Require
that
the
subcontractor
pay
a
prevailing wage which is equivalent to the
wages paid in the railroad industry.

The IAM believes that the Article II, Section 2, as amended by
PEB 219, is flawed because it permits a carrier to control the
timing of the expedited dispute resolution process, and can lead to
the inundation of the organization with a series of notices,
effectively destroying its ability properly to respond to the
carrier's notices. It seeks to amend Section 2 of Article II to
provide for a 30-day preliminary notice of a carrier's intent to
subcontract.
The IAM contends that the Electrical Power Purchase
Agreements, or EPPAs, go beyond subcontracting and are inherently
destructive of the 1964 subcontracting agreement. The organization
states that the practice is a subterfuge that should be condemned
by the Board.
Carriers Position
The carriers contend that the IAM proposals are unreasonable
and an attempt effectively to eliminate subcontracting. They state
that without the ability to resort to outside contractors under the
five criteria allowing subcontracting, as set forth in the 1964
Agreement, carriers would be forced to incur huge unnecessary
expenses and delays to essential work.
The carriers state that nothing about the way in which
machinists work or the way they are affected by the contracting out
rules justifies any changes from the revisions of Article II made
by PEB 219 and Special Board 102-29, which are applicable to the
other shopcrafts.
Moreover, the carriers assert that the same
contracting-out rules must apply to machinists, as well as to the
other shopcrafts, not only in order to reduce administrative costs,
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but also because many jobs being contracted
machinists and nonmachinists work.

out involve both

The carriers point out that the power purchase agreements are
now within the definition of contracting out under the PEB 219
pattern, and that a carrier cannot enter into an EPPA without prior
agreement with the affected organization or authorization by a
neutral arbitrator.
The carriers state that it is clear that the machinists
working for the CSXT are bound by the national bargaining on
contracting out.
Recommendation
This Board cannot recommend, on the basis of the record before
us, that the IAM alone should have the benefit of the changes it
has proposed, while other shopcrafts would be limited to the
recommendations of PEB 219, as clarified by Special Board 102-29,
and as reduced to contract language. We believe that this would be
destabilizing.
The record before this Board does not establish that the new
dispute-resolution procedures developed by PEB 219 and Special
Board 102-29, and reduced to contract language, are biased in the
carriers' favor, as contended by the IAM. Certainly the carriers
and the shopcrafts have a duty of good faith and fair dealing in
regard to the application and utilization of these procedures. It
is the expectation of this Board that the parties will fully live
up to those obligations.
Special Board 102-29, in its interpretation and clarification
phase, stated:
Shop Craft Request No. 4
Does the definition of covered work which the PEB
recommended be included in the revised subcontracting
provisions of the September 25, 1964 Agreement mean that
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EPPAs and similar arrangements are brought within the
scope of the Agreement?
Clarification or Interpretation of the Special Board
The PEB intended that the EPPAs and similar
arrangements are within the scope of the September 25,
1964 Agreement.
The Board believes that inclusion of EPPAs within the scope of
the September 25, 1964, Agreement provides sufficient and
appropriate relief for the IAM concerning power purchase
agreements.
The statement of the IAM General Chairman on the CSXT applied
not only to the CSXT and the IAM, but with equal force to the
dispute between the IAM and all of the other carriers before PEB
220. It is clear that the recommendations of this Board must apply
to all of the carriers before it, including CSXT.
The Board recommends that the PEB
clarified by Special Board 102-29, and
language, be applied to the IAM.
We
withdraw its proposals to amend Article
1964, Agreement on Subcontracting.
E.

219 recommendations, as
as reduced to contract
recommend that the IAM
II of the September 25,

SUCCESSORSHIP/LINE SALES

This issue bears two titles because the parties present it to
us with two identifications.
The IAM refers to it as
"successorship," the carriers, as "line sales."
IAM Position
The IAM seeks a contract clause with "successorship language"
that essentially requires that its recognition, its contract and
the employment of its members be continued and assumed by a new
owner, operator, or lessee of the carrier's line or any part
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thereof (e.g., "shortline transfers") in the event of rail line
transfers, mergers or any similar transactions.
It argues that under present conditions, the carriers may
engage in such practices, leaving machinists suddenly out of work
or employed by the short line with grossly substandard wages and
working conditions and without union coverage.
Carriers Position
The carriers doubt the bargainability of this issue.
Alternatively, they rely on the outcome of the "identical proposal"
by PEB 219. They point out that PEB 219 declined to make any
recommendations on the proposal and that it would "flout" the
intent of Congress in P.L. 102-29 under which Congress withheld
this issue from the jurisdiction of the Special Board, and a
fundamentally inequitable breach of the pattern principle, to grant
the IAM proposal. They assert that the machinists have no greater
need for protection from any form of job loss than other shopcraft
employees.
Recommendation
We find that this issue is properly subject to collective
bargaining.
However, as virtually no other carrier has a
protective clause in its agreements, we find that it would be
profoundly destabilizing to recommend such a clause to the
organization requesting it.
F.

SOUTHERN PACIFIC LINES

This Board has fully considered the positions of the parties
as set forth in their confidential submissions to the Board.
Recommendation
The Board recommends that the IAM and the SP pursue a local
process of negotiations concerning wages, culminating if necessary
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in arbitration, based on the July 18, 1991, Special Board 102-29
Report regarding the "Southern Pacific Transportation Company."
G.

MORATORIUM

We recommend a moratorium period for all matters on which
notices might properly have been served when the last moratorium
ended on July 1, 1988, to be in effect through January 1, 1995.
Notices for changes under Section 6 of the Railway Labor Act
accordingly may be served by any of the parties or another party no
earlier than November 1, 1994.
VII.

CONCLUSION

These recommendations represent our best judgement on the
merits and equities of the issues in dispute. They also represent
our estimate of a fair and realistic package of conditions,
benefits, and benefit changes that, as a totality, should provide
a basis for an acceptable, overall settlement.
We think it would be unrealistic and a costly exercise in
futility for all concerned if our total recommendations did not
take into consideration, as a critical ingredient, their
acceptability by the parties.
Nevertheless, we think it
impracticable to ask that the parties adopt these recommendations
unconditionally and without modification. As the Railway Labor Act
does not make them binding, we expect that the parties will make
adjustments as needed, or if necessary, subject them to major
revision. In any case, we hope that we have provided a well-marked
road map for good faith use by the parties in completing their
contracts through the process of free collective bargaining. We
express to the parties our profound thanks for the intelligent,
comprehensive, and professional presentation of their cases and for
their patience and cooperation with our procedures.
We also
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acknowledge with thanks the assistance of Roland Watkins, the
Special Assistant to the Board.
Respectfully,

Benjamin Aaron, Chairman

Eric «X Schmertz, Member

David P. Twomey, Member)
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Appendix "A"
EXECUTIVE ORDER

_ I 22 2 J ESTABLISHING AN EMERGENCY BOARD TO INVESTIGATE DISPUTES
BETWEEN CERTAIN RAILROADS AND THEIR EMPLOYEES REPRESENTED BY
THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS AND
AEROSPACE WORKERS
Disputes exist between certain railroads and their
employees represented by the International Association of
Machinists and Aerospace Workers as designated on the attached
list, which is made a part of this order.
These disputes have not been adjusted under the provisions
of the Railway Labor Act, as amended (45 U.S.C. 151-188) ("the
Act").
In the judgment of the National Mediation Board, these
disputes threaten substantially to interrupt interstate commerce
to a degree that would deprive various sections of the country
of essential transportation service.
NOW, THEREFORE, by the authority vested in ne as President
by the Constitution and the laws of the United States, including
section 10 of the Act, it is hereby ordered as follows:
Section 1.

Creation of Emergency Board.

There is

created effective April 3, 1992, a board of three members to
be appointed by the President to investigate these disputes.
No member shall be pecuniarily or otherwise interested in any
organization of railroad employees or any railroad carrier.

The

board shall perform its functions subject to the availability o:
funds.
Sec. 2.

Report.

The board shall report to the President

on May 3, 1992, with respect to these disputes.
Sec. 3.

Maintaining Conditions.

As provided by section ::

of the Act, from the data of the creation of the board and for
30 days after the board has submitted its final report to the
President, no change in the conditions out of which the disputes
arose shall be made by the railroads or the employees, except cy
agreement of these parties.

2

Sec. 4.

Expiration.

The board shall terminate upon the

submission of the report provided for in section 2 of this
order.

rTHE WHITE HOUSE,
March 31, 1992.

L

RAILROADS
(NMB Case Nos. A-11544 and A-12250)

Alameda Belt Line Railway
Alton & Southern Railway
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway
Burlington Northern Railroad
Canadian National Railways
Great Lakes Region Lines in U.S.
St. Lawrence Region Lines in U.S.
Canadian Pacific Limited
CSX Transportation,

Inc.

Baltimore and Ohio Railroad
Baltimore and Ohio Chicago Terminal Railroad
Chesapeake and Ohio Railway
Clinchfield Railroad
Seaboard System Railroad
Louisville and Nashville Railroad
(former)
Seaboard Coast Line Railroad (former)
Western Maryland Railway
Chicago & Illinois Midland Railway
Chicago & North Western Transportation Co.
Colorado & Wyoming Railway
Consolidated Rail Corporation
Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad
Duluth, Winnipeg & Pacific Railway
Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Railway
Grand Trunk Western Railroad
Houston Belt and Terminal Railway
Illinois Central Railroad
Kansas City Southern Railway
Louisiana & Arkansas Railway
Milwaukee (Soo Line)-KCS Joint Agency

Kansas City Terminal Railway
Lake Superior & Ishpeming Railroad
Los Angeles Junction Railway
Manufacturers Railway
Meridian & Bigbee Railroad
Missouri Pacific Railroad
Galveston, Houston and Henderson Railroad
Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad
Oklahoma, Kansas & Texas Railroad
Monongahela Railway
New Orleans Public Belt Railroad
Norfolk and Portsmouth Belt Line Railroad
Norfolk Southern Railway Company
Alabama Great Southern Railroad
Atlantic and East Carolina Railway
Carolina & Northwestern Railway
Central of Georgia Railroad
Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Rwy.
Georgia Southern and Florida Railway
Interstate Railroad
New Orleans Terminal Co.
Norfolk and Western Railway
St. Johns River Terminal Company
Tennessee, Alabama and Georgia Railway
Tennessee Railway
Oakland Terminal Railway
Ogden Union Railway and Depot Co.
Peoria & Pekin Union Railway
Pittsburgh & Lake Erie Railroad
Port Terminal Railroad Association
Portland Terminal Railroad Company
Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad
Sacramento Northern Railway
Southern Pacific Transportation Co.
Eastern Lines
Western Lines

Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis
Texas Mexican Railway
Union Pacific Railroad
Western Pacific Railroad

(NMB Case No. A-11071)

CSX Transportation, Inc.
Louisville and Nashville Railroad
(former)
Seaboard Coast Line Railroad (former)

